The V4 towards a new NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass

ANTALL JÓZSEF KNOWLEDGE CENTRE

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The V4 towards a new NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass

Report by V4 Senior Defence Experts

Antall József Knowledge Centre

Casimir Pulaski Foundation

EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy

Slovak Security Policy Institute

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About the Publisher

The Casimir Pulaski Foundation is an independent, non-partisan think- tank specialising in foreign policy and international security. The Pulaski Foundation provides analyses that describe and explain international developments, identify trends in international environment, and contain possible recommendations and solutions for government decision makers and private sector managers to implement.

The Foundation concentrates its research on two subjects: transatlantic relations and Russia and the post-Soviet sphere. It focuses primarily on security, both in traditional and non-military dimensions, as well as political changes and economic trends that may have consequences for Poland and the European Union.

The Casimir Pulaski Foundation is composed of over 70 experts from various fields. It publishes the Pulaski Policy Papers, the Pulaski Report, and the Pulaski Viewpoint. The Foundation also publishes "Informator Pułaskiego," a summary of upcoming conferences and seminars on international policy.

The Foundation experts cooperate with media on a regular basis. Once a year, the Casimir Pulaski Foundation gives the Knight of Freedom Award to an outstanding person who has promoted the values represented by General Casimir Pulaski: freedom, justice, and democracy. Prizewinners include: Professor Władysław Bartoszewski, Professor Norman Davies, Alaksandar Milinkiewicz, President Lech Wałęsa, President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, President Valdas Adamkus, Javier Solana, Bernard Kouchner, Richard Lugar, President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, President Mikheil Saakashvili, Radek Sikorski, Carl Bildt, president Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Michaił Chodorkowski, Mary Robinson, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Dalia Grybauskaitė and Thorbjørn Jagland.

One of the leading projects in the field of international security is the annual Warsaw Security Forum, organised in partnership with the Polish and foreign partners and institutions, which is bringing together policymakers from European Union and NATO countries to discuss major security challenges.

Casimir Pulaski Foundation received an award "Think Tank Awards 2017" in category "Best EU International Affairs think tank", awarded by Prospect magazine. The Foundation was also ranked number 1 Polish think-tank dealing with security and defence, as per the Global Go To Think Tank Index in 2018, 2019 and 2020.

The Casimir Pulaski Foundation has a partnership status with the Council of Europe and is a member of the Group Abroad, an association of Polish non-governmental organisations involved in international cooperation.

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Participating Organisations

The Antall József Knowledge Centre

The Antall József Knowledge Centre is a Budapest-based think tank researching topics of national, regional, and international relevance such as the EU, the Visegrad Cooperation, the future global role of the US, China, and the Middle East, security policy, as well as technological and social innovation.

The institution's main office is located in Budapest, operating with two international departments—focusing on European and global relations, respectively — a research department, and a thematic department—covering areas such talent management and innovation. In addition, AJKC has a regional office in Győr and an office in Brussels, which was established in 2015 to represent the Antall philosophy in the heart of the European Union and promote the values that he stood for at an international level.

The whole of AJKC works toward strengthening institutional relations both at the national and international level, developing scholarship and internship programmes, and boosting professional cooperation via international conferences, workshops, and event series.

The publishing activities of AJKC involve releasing professional publications, scholarly works on political and social sciences (with special regard to security policy and international relations), as well as university textbooks.

Casimir Pulaski Foundation – the leader of the project

The Casimir Pulaski Foundation is an independent, non-partisan think-tank specialising in foreign policy and international security. The Pulaski Foundation provides analyses that describe and explain international developments, identify trends in international environment, and contain possible recommendations and solutions for government decision makers and private sector managers to implement.

The Foundation concentrates its research on two subjects: transatlantic relations and Russia and the post-Soviet sphere. It focuses primarily on security, both in traditional and non-military dimensions, as well as political changes and economic trends that may have consequences for Poland and the European Union. The Casimir Pulaski Foundation is composed of over 70 experts from various fields. It publishes the Pulaski Policy Papers, the Pulaski Report, and the Pulaski Commentaries. The Foundation experts cooperate with media on a regular basis.

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EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy

EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy is a non-profit, non-partisan, and independent think-tank focusing on European integration and cohesion. EUROPEUM contributes to democracy, security, stability, freedom, and solidarity across Europe as well as to active engagement of the Czech Republic in the European Union. EUROPEUM undertakes original research, organises public events and educational activities, and formulates new ideas and recommendations to improve European and Czech policy making.

The Slovak Security Policy Institute

The Slovak Security Policy Institute (SSPI) is an independent non-governmental organisation that interconnects security and defence policy experts from governmental, non-governmental, private and academic institutions. It focuses on research and analysis of security challenges, and has an ambition to raise public awareness on these issues. It has established the first Slovak website on cyber security – CyberSec.sk, and runs a project Infosecurity.sk focusing on disinformation, propaganda, critical thinking, cybersecurity, social media, and privacy online.

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The only organisation within the V4 platform is the International Visegrad Fund. The fund—established in 2000 with the aim of supporting the development of cooperation in culture, scientific exchange, research, education, exchange of students and development of cross-border cooperation and promotion of tourism—represents the civic dimension of V4 cooperation. In majority of cases, the fund provides financing to activities of non-governmental organisations and individual citizens. Apart from grant programs, the fund awards individual scholarships and artist residencies which contribute to the exchange of views in the V4 region and the neighbouring countries.

Introduction

Dear Readers,

We, the representatives of the Antall József Knowledge Centre, the Casimir Pulaski Foundation, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy and the Slovak Security Policy Institute; have the privilege of presenting to you a special report, written by sixteen senior defence experts and entitled "The V4 towards a new NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass". The document is a summary of a broader project entitled: "Returning to the roots of the Visegrad cooperation – coordinating V4 strategy towards NATO Strategic Concept and European defence autonomy" that is supported by the International Visegrad Fund.

The project is aimed at supporting the coordination of the V4 group's stance on works over a new NATO Strategic Concept (recommended by the "NATO 2030: United for a New Era" report by NATO Secretary General) as well as on the idea of the EU strategic autonomy (proposed by some European leaders as a core concept of EU Strategic Compass). As the V4 group was established in order to coordinate the policies of four CEE states towards NATO and the EU, we believe that this is the right format to discuss their future.

As the NATO 2030 report indicated: "NATO must adapt to meet the needs of a more demanding strategic environment marked by the return of systemic rivalry, persistently aggressive Russia, the rise of China, and elevated transnational threats" and "the starting point must be to update the 2010 Strategic Concept". It is hard to disagree with this assessment, however, some of the report's recommendations, being a starting point for the new Strategic Concept, may be considered as more ambiguous, especially from the perspective of NATO Eastern flank states, including the Visegrad Group. Points such as the dual-track approach to Russia, the devotion of more political resources to the security challenges posed by China, integration of the fight against terrorism into NATO core tasks, or limitation of veto power in the Alliance decision-making process at first glance sound reasonable, but as always, the devil is in the details. To exemplify, a greater focus on China can result in the weakening of NATO's core tasks and the weakening of the ability to defend all Members against various military threats. It can also reinvigorate the vision of NATO as a "toolbox" for operations against challenges emerging "Out Of Area", as indicated in the Treaty. While unanimity prolongs the decision-making processes, it also ensures that the decisions, once taken, are indeed implemented. In turn, the concept of EU strategic autonomy, although reasonable, if implemented without necessary care, can and will weaken the trust between the EU and the US. All of these issues are of vital importance for the V4 countries, as their security is based on both NATO and the EU.

The report was coined during as many as four discussions, that altogether included around 200 participants from all V4 states (The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), gathering diplomats, state officials, military officers as well as representatives of V4 think-tank community, academia and young leaders. The 16 senior defence experts (fmr. ministers, ambassadors, generals, think-tank representatives) that contributed most to the below report, worked in four separate working groups that consisted of one expert from each V4 state, in order to assure common stance is found with regards to on each and every of the discussed matters.

We hope that our report will be taken into consideration during the process of drafting both the new NATO Strategic Concept and UE Strategic Compass. It is of upmost importance, that these documents are created as a result of wide consultations both within the respective Member States as well as with senior experts from across Europe.

With the highest respect,
The Antall József Knowledge Centre
The Casimir Pulaski Foundation
EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy
The Slovak Security Policy Institute

Chapter I

NATO's strategic environment and key challenges: V4 perception

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Background: V4 Strategic Environment

The V4 countries (Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), located between the Balkans and the Baltic Sea, occupy a highly contested geographic and geopolitical position on the European continent. These four states are surrounded by four neighbourhoods: two supportive (West and North) and two unstable (South and East). Regardless of the dual categorisation, all the strategic directions present unique opportunities and challenges, which must be analysed jointly by the V4 countries, should they wish to formulate a common working concept of the strategic environment. This section will outline their shared perceptions and interests, while also highlighting the differing emphasis each nation places on the various aspects of the strategic environment. The V4 countries are bound together by their geographic position; historical, cultural, and economic relations; and membership of the EU and NATO. It is therefore natural to extend their cooperation into the field of security, which cannot exist without common understanding and mutual respect.

Before turning to specific issues and country perspectives, some commonalities should be stated regarding the aforementioned strategic directions, in order to lay down the main framework of our analysis regarding the V4's neighbourhoods. Looking from the perspective of Central Europe, the core foundations of the European side of the transatlantic alliance lay to the west, with Germany and Belgium hosting many of the relevant command centres. This direction also includes Austria, which, although neutral, is an EU member state, with no hostilities expected. The Northern direction is supportive towards the V4 perspective, with the main difference compared to the Western direction being that it does not host any of the great allied powers. Norway is a NATO member; neutral Sweden and Finland have secured treaties with NATO, to provide security against a resurgent Russia. Beyond lies the Arctic, an area of growing militarisation and tensions between NATO allies, Russia, and other players, such as China. This Northern area as a whole is expected to become further threatened by Russian activity in the future. Today, however, it is largely stable; therefore, it is not yet a focal point of discussions on the V4 strategic environment, unlike the Southern and Eastern directions, which make up the main focus of the following analysis. These two strategic directions have only two commonalities: their present security challenges and their importance for the alliance as a whole, in particular to the V4 countries. Otherwise, the nature of the two neighbouring regions could not be more different.

1.1. Main threats and challenges for NATO – common V4 perspective

1.1.1. Eastern flank

- **Every NATO member state would agree that Russia poses a substantial security challenge from the East.** The largest successor state of the Soviet Union rewrote the post–Cold War international norms, first by waging a war with the then-NATO aspirant Georgia in 2008, and then by engaging in hybrid warfare against Ukraine in 2014. This eventually led to the illegal annexation of Crimea and the continuing support for the anti-Ukraine, pro-Russian rebels in Luhansk, Donbass and Donetsk in Eastern Ukraine. Once again, NATO's Eastern flank became threatened by military force, employed in order to challenge international rules and engage in power politics. Russia has therefore returned to being a threatening power which has to be actively deterred from continuing these aggressive actions, while at the same time maintaining bilateral communication in order to reduce further tensions. Preserving a dual approach and a delicate balance between these two approaches is one of the key issues in the evaluation of the V4 strategic environment.

- **Furthermore, while Putin's Russia might be a threat today, the experts highlighted that the post-Putin Russia is the true "dark horse" of NATO planning. The experts also agreed that we, as the Alliance, are not prepared for the next 5–10 years, in particular in the Eastern theatre of operations. This particularly challenging area includes the post-Lukashenka Belarus, where we may soon face massive instabilities.** NATO must therefore devise scenarios outlining what will it want to achieve in such circumstances. In these planning processes, the insight of the V4 countries (plus the Baltic States) is a key resource in planning and execution for the rest of the alliance. Growing instability in Eastern Europe is to be expected, but it is within our common interest to prepare for that by, amongst other things, supporting the stability of our neighbours.

1.1.2. Southern flank

- Unlike the Eastern flank, the Southern strategic direction has no hostile states in the vicinity of the V4 group. The potentially unstable Balkans are flanked by a major NATO member and regional power, Turkey. Unlike the East, where state power is the dominant challenge in the form of Russian ambitions, the South is a power vacuum: it is the absence of stable state actors that presents a major challenge. The dominant security challenges are therefore terrorism, civil wars, and irregular migration. Consequently, the strategic directions must be carefully separated in the analysis, in order to shed light on the differing emphases on security perceptions of the strategic environment among the V4 countries.

- Although the Southern direction differs completely from the Eastern direction in terms of the type of threats that it brings, all V4 countries would agree that the challenges rising from the South are important and that NATO should act to defend its interests. Two main aspects should be analysed here: the Balkan theatre and the zones in and beyond the Mediterranean Sea.

- Regarding the immediate Southern neighbourhood, our experts agreed that the stability of the Western Balkan region is a common V4 interest. For them, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is one of the most important NATO missions; thanks to the important role of the Hungarian Defence Force, it can be understood as a success story for Central European security and defence cooperation. It serves as a great example of practical cooperation within the scope of possibilities and available capabilities of the V4 states. As of 2021, the Western Balkans, whose integration into the transatlantic alliance has not yet been completed, is an area surrounded on all sides by NATO member states. Hungary, which supports NATO's open door policy, is especially adamant in this regard in terms of the Western Balkan states. This political and security interest naturally stems from its geographic position and, like Poland over the Eastern question, it aims to rally the other V4 states to this cause.

- Moving further to the South, the sources of security challenges lie in irregular migration and terrorism, as well as other trends contributing to these phenomena; these are within the scope of NATO out-of-area missions. The recent migration crisis on Belarus's borders with Poland and the Baltic States has shown that this is not a uniquely Southern threat, but a process which may gravely threaten the whole V4 region. It should therefore be noted that the V4 is well aware of the negative effects of distant conflict areas. The V4 states took active parts in the stabilisation missions in Afghanistan and Iraq; even more distant mission areas are regularly introduced in V4 discussions, such as a number of conflict-prone countries in the Sahel region. In these areas, the V4 is willing to bear the responsibility for allied action, naturally to the extent of its capabilities.

- Alongside the geographic definition and the geostrategic-informed perception of the strategic environment, threats have become increasingly multifaceted. As the example of the aggression against Ukraine shows, while conventional military capabilities remain highly relevant, security is increasingly moving into non-physical dimensions. This duality of security environments has to be considered and included in the formulation of a common V4 understanding of the developing security architecture. It is important to highlight that, according to the experts who contributed to this piece, balancing between the two different geographical strategic directions constitutes the main challenge to the common V4 stance on many issues. The appearance and gradual growth in importance of non-traditional threats, superseding and existing parallel to traditional challenges, does not diminish the significance of the alliance's core mission.

The first meeting of the Visegrád Group in February 1991: József Antall, Václav Havel and Lech Wałęsa. Author: Péter Antall, CC BY-SA 3.0

1.1.3. NATO cohesion

- **Maintaining cohesion** among the members of the transatlantic alliance has always been important. At various times throughout the decades, unity has been threatened, mainly by the Soviet Union and the occupied Central European Socialist countries during the time of the Cold War. Alliance cohesion is based on a number of factors, including a common threat perception, both external and internal. The experts discussed the relevance of the abovementioned strategic directions and the ways in which they factor into maintaining a balance between them, remembering that any solution would need to be acceptable for the V4 countries and the alliance as a whole. Internal challenges pose a completely different issue; they were much less relevant during the Cold War but are now becoming gradually more important as the "post-post-Cold War" era is emerging, accompanied by discussions among the political elites on ideological stances and acceptable democratic norms. These questions are being discussed among EU member states, and NATO has also raised the issue of connecting democratic principles to a traditionally much more *Realpolitik*-based security alliance. The V4 countries are involved in this; Poland and Hungary are both being criticised, especially in the EU, for certain political steps on the domestic level. Whether these issues should affect NATO conduct, and whether we should involve the domestic political dimension in security affairs, are intensely debated among V4 experts and external stakeholders.

- Divergent threat perceptions have existed within the North Atlantic Alliance for the last 70 years, ever since its inception. Members had their differences during the Cold War and do so now in terms of the China question, albeit with varying emphases. The real question, however, is if these differences will paralyse the organisation at some point. After the dissolution of the Warsaw pact, NATO did not have to deter aggression from any major power. Post-1990 we saw NATO change from a deterrence alliance to a risk management organisation.

The 2014 Russian aggression in Crimea was a wake-up call for NATO, signalling a new era, in which cohesion would be tested on a level arguably unseen in NATO's seven-decade-long history. NATO started to undergo a backwards shift towards becoming a threat response organisation, instead of purely focusing on risk management in its immediate strategic environs and beyond in distant conflict areas.

Port of Shanghai, Yangshan Deep-water Harbour Zone

1.1.4. China

- This issue, which is a novelty in NATO-related discussions, involves **future relations with the People's Republic of China** and the direction that the transatlantic alliance should take regarding the Indo-Pacific. Naturally, the China question is also of key importance for the V4 countries, as all of them are interested in maintaining fruitful economic relations with the world's number-two economy (and arguably number one in terms of purchasing parity). China, however, is a completely different matter to Russia, which geographically borders the Central European region, in particular Poland. Unlike Russia – although there are disagreements over how to approach the expansionist intentions of the former archenemy of the alliance – China does not traditionally present a security threat to the Central European region. Two issues collide in this discussion: the US-China great power competition, playing out particularly in the Indo-Pacific, and the specific channels in which Chinese influence is tangible and arguably extending in Central Europe. Regarding the former, some NATO members – especially those that have substantial global presences, like the United Kingdom and France – support US freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific theatre. France and the UK have the interests and capacity to get involved in this conflict, and fight for the maintenance of the rules-based world order in faraway theatres like the South China Sea. It may therefore be in their interest to engage NATO in their conflicts (diplomatic or military) as a force-multiplier. In contrast, the V4 countries do not have the capabilities to be relevant in the Indo-Pacific region. Unlike the United Kingdom or France, even Poland, by far the largest V4 state, cannot provide useful assets to support countries such as Japan or India. The V4 countries also aim to conduct a careful balancing act between safeguarding their economic interests with China and maintaining their natural support for the US and their Western allies. NATO was, and is, a security community, which serves predominantly to defend the territory of the Alliance. It has, however, evolved to supply out-of-area missions, particularly during the War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq.

- Regarding China, the question is if NATO as an institution can really become an organisation with a global scope, far exceeding its current and originally imagined field of operations. It may also be asked whether it will represent solely US values and interests globally, or if it will be able to successfully manage the complex nature of the security interests of all of its member states – American or European. It is also debated whether NATO is a proper format for the Biden administration to counter China. For the V4 countries, the most important factor among all these debates and processes is to constantly maintain a dialogue on all the levels of the alliance, as these small and medium-sized states have much to lose if the great power competition around the globe continues to escalate.

- From a V4 perspective, it is important to highlight that NATO was not established to fight beyond the borders of the Euro-Atlantic area. Thus, it cannot take responsibility for securing the Pacific. This is despite the fact that a number of European great powers, first and foremost the United Kingdom and France, have assets and interests in the region. However, the rise of China as a global power and its developing great power competition with a prominent NATO member, the United States, naturally requires a serious debate over NATO's security interests vis-á-vis China. If the US was drawn into a serious conflict in East Asia, this would potentially affect its capability to be substantially involved in European defence. This in turn could be exploited by Russia; a logically alarming factor, especially for Poland. This is also an important argument in the discourse regarding the need to increase European defence capabilities. Therefore, the discussion on China is also connected to the abilities of NATO's European member states.

- However, we should not take the Chinese challenge lightly. Even if China is not a direct military threat in the Central European region, it poses a systemic challenge to NATO by conducting disruptive activities in cyberspace, challenging western primacy in outer space, and enhancing cooperation with Russia via joint military exercises. Relations with China are a crucial element of the transatlantic bargain; while the US does not expect Europeans to bear responsibility and provide assets in order to support US interests in the Pacific area, Europe at least must ensure that Chinese influence will not grow in the old continent. The main concern here is not the military threat presented by China in the Central European theatre, but, indirectly, the possibility of internal NATO cohesion being disrupted by diverging views on how to approach China. This should on no account be allowed to happen.

- From a V4 perspective, China might seem to be a systemic challenge for the Western world, but our experts cautioned against oversimplifying this narrative. China offers readily available and accessible funds for a lot of its partners, not only in Eastern Europe, but in the West. Thus, some NATO countries might see Beijing as a potential friend rather than a foe. In this situation, it is very important to clarify the basis on which we can argue that China poses a threat to us, and how we can continue to do business with them while making them stop certain activities (e.g. the spread of Chinese technology companies) which can be considered as issues of national security. The V4 counties are naturally cautious about involving China in the NATO threat perception, as the V4's relatively small states want the great powers to avoid military conflict.

1.1.5. Cyber domain and new technologies

- This issue, over which there are no major disagreements among V4 states, comprises **cybersecurity** and the development of the alliance's resilience in cyberspace. All member states agree that this new operational domain has become vital in all types of conflicts, and therefore must be a key area of cooperation amongst NATO members. Our experts also noted that cyber resilience is an area where cohesion can be achieved at the lowest cost. This does not diminish the importance of the topic at hand; rather, it shows us that there are still key challenges which have to be overcome in the near future. Despite the fact that it is not a physical area of operations, cyberspace cannot be separated from the aforementioned geopolitical tensions. It is also connected with the question of the alliance's stance towards Russia and China; both of these countries have robust capabilities in cyberspace, which they are keen to utilise in the developing great power competition. This factor is also relevant on a lower level, connected to other disruptive and hostile powers such as Iran or North Korea, as well as non-state actors such as international terrorist organisations. The V4 countries naturally have lower levels of readiness in cyberspace than the great powers do; however, it is entirely possible for small and medium-sized powers to enhance their resilience against cyberattacks. For example, Estonia reacted (with the support of NATO) to Russian cyber aggression, and developed robust defensive infrastructure and practices, which should be emulated by other countries.

Due to its limited size, resources, demography, and industrial capacity, Estonia could not aspire to such a power position in terms of conventional warfare. International cooperation in cyber resilience is also a force multiplier, and no country can or should rely solely on itself. Thus, it is in the interests of security and political stability to have more pronounced cooperation in this field. The V4 can be a champion in this area: Poland is a great example of the rapid development of the cyber industry, deeply anchored in the transatlantic alliance.

FBI wanted poster of Russian military officers indicted in connection to Fancy Bear (also known as APT28), a Russian cyber espionage group.

- The security environment in the 21st century is fundamentally different to any time in the past. The geopolitics of today is not about the possession of territory and material resources, but about the interdependence of economies and companies, as well as the incorporation of new technologies, such as 5G networks and AI, often developed either in the US or China. In such an environment, NATO should incorporate defence capabilities into the fields of cyberspace, countering fake news, human trafficking, and weaponising migration. NATO must be prepared for future challenges; however, this is a much harder task to accomplish in the V4 region than it is in Western Europe. This can and should be seen as an opportunity. While the V4 countries have neither the population bases nor the resources to compete with global leading players, the knowledge-based economies of tomorrow create a solid chance even for small and medium-sized states to catch up with wealthier and bigger states.

1.1.6. Resilience

- In order to tackle these challenges, NATO members have to be resilient, but there is also a need for a terminological debate on the merits and meaning of resilience. We need to differentiate between the classical understanding of resilience as civil preparedness relating to crisis response and management; democratic resilience relating to institutions, values and commitments; and cyber resilience. While cyber resilience and civil preparedness are low-hanging fruits from a cooperation perspective, democratic resilience will be a subject of heated political discussion.

- In the coming years, NATO will begin to see more and more so-called "homeland deployments". These will be mainly in response to climate change and caused by extreme weather events such as floods, wildfires and heavy storms. With the increasing intensity of such events, civilian agencies responsible for crisis response and management will not have sufficient capabilities, leading to the need for deployment of armed forces. On a mass scale, we witnessed such a scenario in 2020, where armed forces were deployed to support the countering of the COVID-19 pandemic. Central topics in Alliance discussions on how to adapt to these coming challenges should include enhancing the interoperability of armed forces with civilian agencies in crisis situations, reviewing the adequacy of national legal frameworks, and refocusing CIMIC efforts from peacebuilding missions abroad to "home front" deployments. Of course, all this is directly connected to the need for enhanced resilience building and civil preparedness.

1.1.7. Decision-making process

- The NATO 2030 report by the Secretary General outlined some necessary reforms in terms of political decision-making processes; it suggested changes to the fundamental underpinnings of NATO and, therefore, alliance cohesion itself. The report, written among others by Wess Mitchell, is a thought-provoking document. However, it is highly unlikely that the decision-making process will truly undergo a fundamental procedural change, nor is it clearly in the Alliance's interest to reform this aspect. NATO's current decision-making process reflects decades of tradition and political will. It maintains and underpins internal cohesion, to the benefit of all NATO allies. The V4 countries share the positive sentiment that the current consensus-based process is within the group's best interest. Leaving consensus-decision-making behind in any area promotes a perception of decreased cohesion to our adversaries and a potential angle where internal disagreements might be exploited to undermine the alliance. This is a risk factor that all NATO allies – particularly the V4 member states, which are reliant on NATO's traditional threat response capabilities – want to avoid.

Military base at Perevalne during the 2014 occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by Russian troops with their state-insignia removed.
Author: Anton Holoborodko, CC BY-SA 3.0

Case study: main threats and challenges for NATO – differences in perspectives among V4 countries

The experts participating in the research had a long discussion on how to employ the V4 as a common platform for debating, setting, and formulating joint answers to security threats, including within the NATO context. It has therefore become clear that this issue needs in-depth discussion, not only by the V4 stakeholders but also by other members of the alliance. All experts agreed on the importance of practical cooperation, in which the V4 framework provides a useful and effective platform to achieve joint goals. For issues that can be effectively contextualised in a V4 framework, the discussion focused on identifying the compromise between two contradictory claims: intra-V4 cleavages and the differences that make joint perceptions unrealistic, and the claim that the V4 is not inclusive enough, and an even wider Central-Eastern European platform might be more relevant to formulating common stances for certain challenges.

Poland naturally views Russia as its main security threat. Its Eastern neighbour has an alarming track record of destabilizing its neighbours while maintaining a strong nuclear capability. The geopolitical situation of Poland is fundamentally unique. It shares long borders with Russia and Belarus, making military considerations much more relevant than in other V4 countries. Poland wants joint action from its V4 partners and is very impatient with the other three states' foot-dragging, especially when it comes to the Russian question. The Czech Republic has been historically less enthusiastic about stepping up against Russian disruptive activities in the region. However, after the Russian-Czech sabotage case of 2020, the V4 reacted with a joint declaration, which the Czech Republic deemed too soft on Russia. Prague, unlike Warsaw, understands the concerns of the other two V4 countries which motivated them to support only a tempered version of the joint declaration.

By 2021, then, two of the four V4 countries would be willing to support a stronger stance against Russia. This issue will be further analysed below; however, it should be noted that differing approaches towards Russia are the major obstacle to full V4 cooperation in the field of security. This paper will argue that this issue lurks within a wide range of topics and concepts where mutual understanding exists in the V4.

The second issue raised by the experts was whether the V4 is the most appropriate platform for channelling Central European interests into NATO decision making. Related to this is the importance of other platforms, such as the Bucharest 9 (B9). This format also includes the V4 countries; but, to a certain point, it has more relevance in terms of NATO issues. On the other hand, in the past there were disputes within the B9 as well because of different perceptions of Russia and China. The B9 and other larger platforms for cooperation seem to be divided by the same issues that divide the V4, and would possibly bring about even more disagreement due to their wider membership. Even if the V4 is not the "best" platform to discuss NATO issues, at least its members share common interests based on their geographic proximity, size, and economies. The best platform to discuss NATO issues, in the end, is NATO itself. Therefore, the V4's role has to be clarified: it should be the stage for preparatory work, as well as a platform for aligning viewpoints, while also offering joint action in the scope of the V4 countries' capabilities and interests. The V4 is indispensable, and its usefulness and applicability should not be underestimated.

It is also important to highlight that, beyond the much-debated Russian question, the V4 countries agree on the fundamentals of the alliance's goals. Readying NATO for collective defence and hybrid warfare, as well as enhancing cyber resilience – these are the shared cornerstones that make up the V4 mutual understanding in the area of NATO. We might debate the relative importance of the threats from the Eastern and Southern flanks; however, no V4 country would argue that Russian activity in the East is not a threat. No V4 country could imagine its security without the US or the transatlantic bond. This bond is the key pillar on which NATO stands, and is firmly engraved into the national interests of V4 countries and their strategic defence planning.

Arguably, the most divisive issue in the V4 security perception is currently that of Russia. We must start by outlining the Polish perception, which has the stoutest concerns vis-à-vis the Eastern strategic direction. The relative lack of consideration by the other three, more sheltered V4 states, might become an obstacle to the furthering of intra-V4 security cooperation by the largest V4 member state. As noted before, Poland has long borders with Russia and Belarus, making military considerations much more visible and important than in other V4 countries. Warsaw naturally understands that NATO is much stronger militarily than Russia, especially when it comes to conventional warfare. The NATO troops in Poland and its neighbouring states are of key importance; however, they remain scattered throughout the whole Eastern flank, while Russia is much better positioned to concentrate its forces towards certain territories on its frontiers. This means that Russia can create an overbearing force in strategic locations, thereby threatening NATO allies and achieving political goals, and even military victory in the case of a conventional armed conflict. One visible form of Russian preparedness is military exercises, especially snap ones, which pose a serious threat to European stability. Snap exercises are unannounced; therefore, they do not welcome foreign observers. These military activities are conducted in very close proximity to the Polish border, which regularly raises alarms in Warsaw. Therefore, Poland is very interested in measures that increase predictability and transparency, as well as providing early warning capability vis-à-vis Russia. Transparency has decreased in general in this Eastern theatre in recent years, and the ineffective Open Skies Treaty is a particular concern of Polish security officials. This initiative has to be reimagined, and potentially limited to cover only Europe. New agreements must be drafted to reduce the risks of accidents and misunderstandings that might lead to direct military confrontation on NATO's Eastern flank, especially on the Polish border.

It is also logical to conclude that, under these very tangible security threats, NATO decision-making is deemed slow from a Polish defence planning perspective; in a real combat situation, which is always a realistic possibility, it would cause serious problems. Therefore, it is suggested that the mandate of SACEUR must be revisited under the changed circumstances. The priority should be the development of the capacity to promptly respond to any contingency, which would require the development of various logistical measures and the improvement of the decision-making mechanisms that are already in place.

Poland has a particular interest in Russian tactical nuclear weapons, which can reach Poland (the entire Polish territory is within the scope of short-range ballistic missiles, such as the Iskander tactical missile system). This is especially so since the language of Russian strategic documents regarding the use of such weapons is vague and, therefore, unpredictable and dangerous. NATO must take more steps to clarify this issue, and pressure Russia to explain the planned usage of any nuclear weapons in Europe. Furthermore, the so-called Russian "de-escalation" concept, which allows for the launch of nuclear strikes at an early stage of a conflict in order to prevent further escalation, must be discussed with Moscow. There is also a need for a new INF Treaty, which should be a European rather than just a strictly Polish interest. Warsaw is predominantly concerned with Russia's tactical nuclear weapons and the lack of transparency over them, which could lead to unintended nuclear threats/strikes.

Hungary maintains a dual-track approach towards Russia; that is, deterrence and dialogue at the same time. From the Hungarian point of view, the greatest possible denominator for NATO members would be to fully reset dialogue with Russia, and thus to decrease the level of hostility in the long run. Very much connected to this issue is the Hungarian view on Ukraine, which is often misunderstood. Hungary cares about Ukraine's territorial integrity and supports it via practical cooperation. However, the goal of Budapest is to get Ukrainian leaders to honour their commitments toward minority rights, and so Budapest is using the available forum, NATO, to achieve this. However, it has not and will not connect the decision to veto any further integration between NATO and Ukraine to the issue of countering Russia. Practical and military cooperation between NATO and Ukraine is important for Budapest, as evidenced by Hungary's positive appraisal of Ukraine's bid to become an enhanced opportunities partner in NATO in the summer of 2020. However, we know that Ukraine's commitment to upholding minority rights is more important for Budapest than for other V4 countries.

It must be noted that conventional and hybrid threats from Russia are alarming not only to Poland, but also to the other V4 states. Slovakia and Hungary (regardless of the abovementioned political issues) are threatened by the destabilisation of Ukraine and by hybrid warfare, which could equally be used against them. The Czech Republic is more aware of cyber threats from Russia, as it has already been a target of such actions, but since it is not located on the NATO/EU Eastern flank, it is naturally less agitated by the potential for conventional attacks or even more physical forms of hybrid threats (e.g. migration pressure from the East). All four V4 countries are vulnerable to fake-news campaigns, which aim to undermine trust in the domestic political system, the elite, and the Western alliance as a whole. Naturally, Poland is more resilient to such propaganda efforts due to its historical experiences and strong national identity. To summarise, all the V4 states understand the gravity of the Eastern strategic direction; however, they view it on very different scales (from nuclear attacks against major cities to cyberattacks). Still, the general trajectory of threat perception gives a solid base for formulating joint stances through laborious negotiation efforts.

The other broadly debated issue was whether NATO should be an activist or a guardian angel in terms of democratic values among its members. Currently, debates are ongoing on all levels and in all sectors over how much NATO can, and whether it should, shift to this internally focused political dimension.

From the US perspective, there is general agreement that political values and domestic stability are both important for alliance cohesion, and that the real political challenge for Washington is to find the proper balance between debating domestic political matters in allied states and building an institution capable of countering external security challenges. It is especially important to find a way to disaggregate the China challenge from the internal democracy debate.

All the V4 states perceive maintaining alliance cohesion to be amongst the top challenges and fundamental responsibilities for the future. Hungarian foreign policy aims to balance its realist deterrence approach with guaranteeing its security within an alliance structure and working under the tenets of this community of values. Hungary's current NATO policy is equally devoted to both goals. For Slovakia, cohesion in NATO is pre-eminent; it is using its political tools to resolve any issues as quickly as possible, meanwhile respecting and understanding the concerns of the sovereign member states of the organisation. The Czech perception of security threats is also in line with NATO mainstream messages: collective defence and hybrid warfare are top of the priority list. Every ally's threat perception must be considered with regards to both the Eastern and Southern flanks. Thus, the indivisible nature of security within NATO is of utmost importance. For the Czech Republic, the growing internal divisions within NATO are one of the biggest risks. Therefore, they support every initiative that helps to maintain consensus. Prague believes that bilateral grievances, if unrelated to NATO, should not be included in the alliance's framework, because this might further increase internal division. According to our experts, the recent Afghanistan withdrawal will raise questions about NATO's cohesion, a dangerous self-doubt in itself. V4 officials should be particularly cautious about the ways in which this issue is communicated in order not to alienate their citizens from NATO and undermine internal popular support for the alliance.

Practical cooperation of the V4 has existed for years, in spite of obvious differences in terms of threat perception (Hungary focuses on the South, Poland on the East, while the Czech Republic and Slovakia balance between these stances and focus on new types of challenges). Despite these difficulties, it has been possible to facilitate cooperation on practical issues. Recently, however, this momentum has dissipated. It seems to be less and less feasible to deliver something within the security and defence domain. The EU-V4 Battlegroup and the joint logistics support group are widely seen as serious V4 efforts; however, they could have been much more than just that. More than seven years have passed since the publication of Defence Austerity: a New Paradigm for Defence and Security Cooperation in the Visegrad Region, and the results are far from what the experts envisioned in 2014.

National perspectives summarised

- *Naturally, the Polish perspective on the developing strategic environment is concerned mostly with the Russian threat. Warsaw is alarmed by the conventional, hybrid, and nuclear threat that its Eastern neighbour poses to the region and Poland itself. The largest member state of the V4 naturally aims to rally the other three states to consider this issue more robustly. This, however, does not mean that Poland is not a vital partner in tackling Southern challenges, cyber resilience, and other threats. The focus on Russia does not mean that Warsaw is unaware of the other issues; deep discussions are needed to alleviate the superficial notion of a one-dimensional Polish perception of the multifaceted strategic environment and challenges.*

- *For the Czech Republic, the top priority is the question of collective defence and hybrid warfare. Every ally's threat perception must be considered, both with regards to the Eastern and Southern flanks. Thus, the indivisible nature of security within NATO is of utmost importance to Prague. The growing internal divisions in NATO are one of the biggest risks for Czech security. For this reason, the Czechs support every initiative that helps to maintain consensus. They believe that bilateral grievances, if unrelated to NATO, should not be included in the alliance's framework, because this may increase internal divisions.*

- *Slovakia shares many of the views of the Czech Republic: hybrid threats and crumbling cohesion in NATO are at the forefront of its security perceptions. Slovakia is well aware of the new types of challenges; as it is largely shielded by other V4 states from the main thrusts of the Eastern (by Poland) and the Southern (by Hungary) strategic directions, it can serve as a champion of enhancing readiness in the non-physical realms. Unlike the Czech Republic, however, Slovakia has a frontier with Ukraine; therefore it is more concerned with preventing destabilisation on its Eastern borders through security partnerships with Kiev.*

- *Hungary, as the most southern V4 member state, is often perceived to have a somewhat different set of priorities than the other states. It is important to note that deterrence against Russia is important for Budapest and there are no arguments regarding this issue. Southern threats, predominantly irregular migration, are at the top of the Hungarian security agenda.*

1.2. Conclusion

- This chapter has analysed both the commonalities and the differences among V4 states' perceptions regarding future threats, both in geographic and topical terms. It has noted how a separation between the Eastern and the Southern strategic directions is a worthwhile distinction to conceptualise V4 security policies. There is a clear need to speak of relative rather than absolute importance for each country when discussing this matter. All the V4 members agree that the Russian threat is real and that destabilisation has to be countered and deterred by all means. In addition, Ukraine is a vital security partner: all V4 states support stabilisation and cooperation efforts with Kiev. Similarly, the V4 is united in seeing Western Balkan stability as a key priority. There are, however, differences in willingness to take responsibility for these processes. While Poland champions the Eastern strategic direction, Hungary fosters a more focused approach to the South.

- Alongside the geographically defined threats, three distinct challenges emerged in the discussion. China is mostly an indirect issue, in light of US-China competition, where V4 states serve only an auxiliary role. They aim to uphold alliance cohesion while preserving Chinese investments and trade opportunities, and also pushing back against real security threats, primarily in cyberspace. China, therefore, presents a balancing task for the V4 countries in the NATO framework. Cyberspace itself is a "low-hanging fruit" for cooperation and an important one at that. This is, and will be, a chief area where the V4 countries can push forward their joint action. **For the V4 states, however, the key issue is alliance cohesion. Beyond all the issues presented above, their main objective is to maintain the NATO security umbrella and its core tasks of defending Europe and the US from aggression. None of the V4 states wants a situation in which NATO guarantees would diminish. Every discussion and every political manoeuvre must abide by this iron rule.**

- The experts also noted that the V4 is a suitable venue for preparatory work on the NATO security stance, but, in the end, NATO's future will be decided at NATO forums and not by regional alliances. Where the V4 comes into play is in discussing each country's approaches and finding areas of joint action – either within the political-diplomatic or the security-military dimensions – where V4 interests and capabilities lead to actionable initiatives. These can channel joint messages into the alliance framework or into larger-scale initiatives, such as the V4 Battle Group, the KFOR leadership position, or even other out-of-area missions. The V4 has its disagreements connected to security, but these must not be an obstacle to real and useful cooperation benefitting not only the Central European region but also the NATO alliance as a whole.

Chapter II

Core Tasks and Principles in NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept

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2.1. NATO'S Core Tasks and Principles

- NATO remains the strongest and most successful alliance in history. NATO's fundamental and enduring purpose has not changed since the 2010 Strategic Concept. This should be clearly underlined in the 2022 Strategic Concept: NATO's ultimate goal is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. The basic ingredients for this mission remain in force: military strength, political solidarity, unity and cohesion, combined with pursuit of a long-term stable international environment.

The Preamble of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

- The 2022 Strategic Concept should be based on the premise that NATO Allies form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The fact that Allies remain committed to these foundational values is one of the most important factors in ensuring the durability of the Alliance. As the Reflection Group, appointed by the NATO Secretary General, underlined in its 2019 report "NATO 2030: United for a New Era", a shared democratic identity is what distinguishes NATO from its adversaries and competitors.

- At the 2021 NATO Brussels Summit, the Allies decided to open a new chapter in transatlantic relations. This was predominantly a political act, signalling Allied openness to the re-emergence of American leadership in NATO. The 2022 Strategic Concept should be clear about the centrality of transatlantic relations and the firmness of the political and military bonds between Europe and North America. For all its member states, NATO should be a point of reference for any discussion that touches upon Euro-Atlantic security. No other international organisation, including the European Union, can replace NATO in its core mission of collective defence. Moreover, the consolidation of the transatlantic alliance in the next decade should allow the Allies to be even better prepared to operate in the era of strategic competition. At the same time, the 2022 Strategic Concept should characterise NATO as a regional organisation that concentrates on the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security. A global NATO should be excluded, even if the Alliance was politically ready to face global challenges such as pandemics or the impact of climate change on security.

- The 2010 Strategic Concept stated that the security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. This must remain a central element of the Allied approach in the era of strategic competition, and be reconfirmed in the 2022 Strategic Concept. The core principle of indivisibility of security serves as a cementing component between the different threat perceptions among Allies and is the political glue of this unique community. This is especially vital in any discussions between Allies and Russia on arms control. Arms control measures should maintain the strategic unity and political cohesion of the Alliance, and should safeguard the principle of the indivisibility of Alliance security by avoiding the creation of areas of unequal security.

- Since 2010, NATO's security environment has substantially changed. As the Reflection Group rightly pointed out, the 2010 Strategic Concept recommended cultivating a strategic partnership with Russia, made limited mention of terrorism, and did not mention China at all. Based on this assessment, the 2010 Strategic Concept formulated three essential core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. These have guided NATO and the Allies over the last decade. The 2022 Strategic Concept should maintain the three core tasks approach. However, it needs to adapt to the current security environment, which is more volatile and unpredictable, and is marked by increasing competition on one hand and the reconfiguration of partnerships on the other. The importance and role of each core task in NATO's overall strategy should be measured against and guided by this assumption.

- The 2022 Strategic Concept should acknowledge that Russia's growing multi-domain military build-up, more assertive posture, novel military capabilities and provocative activities, including near NATO borders, increasingly threaten the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and hence contribute to instability along NATO borders and beyond. The same can be said for its large-scale no-notice and snap exercises, continued military build-up in Crimea, deployment of modern dual-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, deepening military integration with Belarus, and repeated violations of NATO Allied airspace.

Russian Strategic Deterrent Forces			
Missile System	**Type**	**Number of Systems**	**Range**
RS-12M Topol NATO: SS-25 Sickle	mobile ICBM*	18	11,000+ km
RS-12M2 Topol-M NATO: SS-27 mod 1	mobile and silo-based ICBM	78	11,000 km
RS-18 NATO: SS-19 Stiletto	silo-based ICBM	24	10,000 km
RS-20 NATO: SS-18 Satan	silo-based ICBM	46	10,200 - 16,000 km
RS-24 Yars NATO: SS-27 mod 2	mobile and silo-based ICBM	170	10,500 km
It is estimated that as for 2021 Russia has 336 active ballistic missiles capable of caring from 1 to 10 independent MIRVs. A total number of warheads is estimated to be just short of 1200.			
R-29RKU-02 Stantsia-02 NATO: SS-N-18 M1 Stingray	SLBM**	16	6,500 km
R-29RMU2 Sineva **R-29RMU2.1 Layner** NATO: SS-N-23 Skiff	SLBM	96	11,000 km
R-30 Bulava NATO: SS-N-32	SLBM	54	8,300 km
Russia currently has 11 SLBM-capable submarines of different types in its inventory. It is estimated that as of 2021, Russia has 166 active submarine-launched strategic ballistic missiles capable of carrying from 3 to 6 independent MIRVs. The number of warheads for SLBM is estimated to be around 650.			
AS-15 Kent Kh-55	nuclear capable ALCM***	No estimates available	2,500 km
AS-23B Kh-102	nuclear capable ALCM	No estimates available	2,500 - 2,800 km
Russia has just short of 70 bombers capable of carrying nuclear cruise missiles, however it is extremely hard to estimate how many are there in the inventory. Different studies identify that Russia can have from 200 to 800 of these.			

*ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile **SLBM, submarine-launched ballistic missile ***ALCM, air-launched cruise missile

Nuclear capable carriers in development

The Russian Armed Forces are currently developing several nuclear-capable carriers, including new types of land based strategic ballistic missiles, nuclear-capable torpedoes and nuclear-capable cruise missiles.

They include: SS-27 Yars-M ICBM; SS-29 Sarmat ICBM; SS-X-29B Rubezh ICBM; SSC-X-9 Skyfall CM; and Status-6 Poseidon torpedo.

- Russia's military-backed destabilisation campaign, intended to impose conditions of unpeace in the Euro-Atlantic space, extends well beyond NATO's eastern flank. It includes conducting grey zone operations, particularly in the information and cyber sphere, in order to translate incremental gains at the operational level into strategic gains in its long-term conflict with NATO. The 2022 Strategic Concept should set realistic expectations with regards to Russia. There is no reason to expect Russia's posture toward NATO to drastically change for the better in the mid-to-long term, whether President Vladimir Putin remains part of the equation or not.

Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers, 1 April 2014

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of NATO, are united in our condemnation of Russia's illegal military intervention in Ukraine and Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. We do not recognize Russia's illegal and illegitimate attempt to annex Crimea. We urge Russia to take immediate steps, as set out in the statement by the NATO-Ukraine Commission, to return to compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities, and to engage immediately in a genuine dialogue towards a political and diplomatic solution that respects international law and Ukraine's internationally recognized borders. We support the deployment of an OSCE monitoring mission to Ukraine.

2. Our goal of a Euro-Atlantic region whole, free, and at peace has not changed, but has been fundamentally challenged by Russia. We support the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of all states within their internationally recognised borders. An independent, sovereign, and stable Ukraine, firmly committed to democracy and respect for human rights, minorities, and the rule of law, is key to Euro-Atlantic security.

3. In order to demonstrate our commitment to Ukraine, we will intensify our cooperation in the framework of our Distinctive Partnership. Today NATO and Ukraine have agreed, as set out in the statement by the NATO-Ukraine Commission, to implement immediate and longer-term measures in order to strengthen Ukraine's ability to provide for its own security.

4. We have also today agreed a package of measures aimed at deepening our cooperation with other NATO partners in Eastern Europe, in consultation with them and within our existing bilateral programmes.

5. Over the past twenty years, NATO has consistently worked for closer cooperation and trust with Russia. However, Russia has violated international law and has acted in contradiction with the principles and commitments in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Basic Document, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the Rome Declaration. It has gravely breached the trust upon which our cooperation must be based.

6. We have decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia. Our political dialogue in the NATO-Russia Council can continue, as necessary, at the Ambassadorial level and above, to allow us to exchange views, first and foremost on this crisis. We will review NATO's relations with Russia at our next meeting in June.

7. As stated by our Heads of State and Government at the Chicago Summit in 2012, NATO is based on solidarity, Alliance cohesion, and the indivisibility of our security. In the current situation, the Alliance has already taken steps to demonstrate solidarity and strengthen its ability to anticipate and respond quickly to any challenges to Alliance security. We will continue to provide appropriate reinforcement and visible assurance of NATO's cohesion and commitment to deterrence and collective defence against any threat of aggression to the Alliance.

- The 2022 Strategic Concept should integrate the fight against terrorism into NATO's core tasks much more explicitly than the 2010 document. Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, continues to pose a direct threat to the security of Allied populations, and to international stability and prosperity. The Strategic Concept should clearly underline that nations retain the primary responsibility for their domestic security and resilience. However, the fight against terrorism also demands a coherent long-term effort by the international community as a whole, involving a wide range of instruments and actors. Cooperation in NATO adds value to Allies' national efforts and capacity to prevent, mitigate, respond to and be resilient against acts of terrorism.

Milestones in NATO's Work on Counter-Terrorism since the 2010 Strategic Concept

May 2012

At the Chicago Summit, NATO Leaders endorse new policy guidelines for Alliance work on counter-terrorism, which focus on improved threat awareness, adequate capabilities and enhanced engagement with partner countries and other international actors. The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism is subsumed into the overall NATO approach. The NATO Military Concept for Counter-Terrorism, which reflects the policy guidelines, becomes a public document in 2016.

July 2016

At the Warsaw Summit, Allied Leaders decide to provide support through NATO to the fight against ISIL. NATO AWACS aircraft will provide information to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. NATO will begin training and capacity building in Iraq, while continuing to train hundreds of Iraqi officers in Jordan. Allies will enhance ongoing cooperation with Jordan in areas such as cyber defence and countering roadside bombs. Allies also undertake to promote information-sharing through the optimised use of multilateral platforms and to continue to seek to enhance cooperation in exchanging information on returning foreign fighters.

October 2016

Operation Active Endeavour is terminated and succeeded by Sea Guardian, a broader maritime operation in the Mediterranean. Sea Guardian is a flexible maritime operation that is able to perform the full range of maritime security tasks, if so decided by the North Atlantic Council.

5 February 2017

NATO launches a new training programme in Iraq, teaching Iraqi security forces to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

16 February 2017

Defence ministers agree to create a new regional 'Hub for the South', based at NATO's Joint Force Command in Naples. It will be a focal point for increasing both the Alliance's understanding of the challenges stemming from the region, and its ability to respond to them.

31 March 2017

Foreign ministers decide to step up their efforts inside Iraq, including with military medicine courses to train new paramedics, and with training to help maintain tanks and armoured fighting vehicles.

25 May 2017

At their meeting in Brussels, Allies agree an action plan to do more in the international fight against terrorism with: more AWACS flight time, more information-sharing and air-to-air refuelling; NATO's membership in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIL; the establishment of a new terrorism intelligence cell at NATO Headquarters and the appointment of a coordinator to oversee NATO's efforts in the fight against terrorism.

5-6 December 2017

At their meeting, foreign ministers underline the continuing need to provide support to NATO's southern partners in building counter-terrorism capabilities and institutions. NATO and the European Union agree to boost their cooperation in the fight against terrorism, including by strengthening the exchange of information, coordinating their counter-terrorism support for partner countries and working to improve national resilience to terrorist attacks.

15 February 2018

At their meeting, defence ministers agree to start planning for a NATO training mission in Iraq, at the request of the Iraqi government and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

11 July 2018

At the Brussels Summit, Allies decide to establish a training mission in Iraq. They will continue to contribute to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and will also increase their support to partners to further develop their capacities to tackle terrorism.

4-5 December 2018

Foreign ministers agree an updated action plan on enhancing NATO's role in the international community's fight against terrorism. It consolidates NATO's counter-terrorism activities related to awareness, preparedness, capability development and engagement with partners.

14 February 2019

Defence ministers endorse a practical framework to counter unmanned aircraft systems and a set of guidelines on civil-military cooperation in case of a potential CBRN terrorist attack.

3-4 April 2019

At their meeting on the occasion of NATO's 70th anniversary, foreign ministers task a further review of NATO's counter-terrorism action plan.

4 December 2019

At their meeting, Allied Leaders note an updated action plan to enhance NATO's role in the international community's fight against terrorism. They also take stock of NATO's role in the fight against terrorism, including the Alliance's training missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which continue to play a key role in preventing the resurgence of ISIS and other terrorist groups.

12-13 February 2020

Defence ministers agree in principle to enhance NATO Mission Iraq by taking on some of the Global Coalition's training activities.

12 June 2020

NATO launches its first standardized Counter-Terrorism Reference Curriculum.

22-23 October 2020

NATO agrees a Battlefield Evidence Policy to facilitate the sharing of information obtained in NATO missions and operations for law enforcement purposes. At the same time, a Practical Framework for Technical Exploitation is approved.

23-24 March 2021

Foreign ministers task an update of the counter-terrorism action plan in time for their next meeting in December 2021.

14 June 2021

At the Brussels Summit, Allies reaffirm their condemnation of terrorism in the strongest possible terms. They commit to updating the 2019 Action Plan by the end of 2021 to take account of the evolving terrorist threats.

- The 2022 Strategic Concept should concentrate on the parameters of a political strategy for approaching a world in which China will be of growing importance through to 2030. The global impact of China's rise certainly requires a cohesive response by the West. Therefore, it appears certain that these challenges will become more prominent inside the Alliance in the coming decade. NATO's role in coordinating the response of the so-called "West" should be well calibrated, taking into consideration the fact that the Alliance will remain a regional organisation that predominantly concentrates on the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security. Therefore, a more robust NATO stance on China should not result in attention and, more importantly, resources being diverted from deterrence and defence against Russia. Instead, NATO's priorities with regards to China should concentrate on topics such as enhancing Allied resilience, protecting the Alliance's technological edge, enhancing NATO's standardisation efforts, evaluating Chinese-Russian cooperation, and coordinating Allied approaches to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts. Nevertheless, NATO cannot ignore the possibility or the consequences of a confrontation between China and the United States.

2021 NATO Summit Decisions with regard to China (paragraphs 55 and 56 of the Brussels Summit Communiqué)

55. China's stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security. We are concerned by those coercive policies which stand in contrast to the fundamental values enshrined in the Washington Treaty. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a larger number of sophisticated delivery systems to establish a nuclear triad. It is opaque in implementing its military modernisation and its publicly declared military-civil fusion strategy. It is also cooperating militarily with Russia, including through participation in Russian exercises in the Euro-Atlantic area. We remain concerned with China's frequent lack of transparency and use of disinformation. We call on China to uphold its international commitments and to act responsibly in the international system, including in the space, cyber, and maritime domains, in keeping with its role as a major power.

56. NATO maintains a constructive dialogue with China where possible. Based on our interests, we welcome opportunities to engage with China on areas of relevance to the Alliance and on common challenges such as climate change. There is value in information exchange on respective policies and activities, to enhance awareness and discuss potential disagreements. Allies urge China to engage meaningfully in dialogue, confidence-building, and transparency measures regarding its nuclear capabilities and doctrine. Reciprocal transparency and understanding would benefit both NATO and China.

- The three core tasks remain vital pillars for maintaining political solidarity, unity and cohesion between the Allies. However, the 2022 Strategic Concept should restore collective defence as the task that could be best described as primus inter pares. Collective defence is the only core task that is derived directly from the Washington Treaty. Up to now, as many as five out of the seven Strategic Concepts in NATO's history have been collective defence centric. Collective defence should therefore remain at the heart of the Alliance, as set out in article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Evolution of NATO Strategy 1949-1999



- In the last seven years, NATO has undergone its biggest military adaptation since the end of the Cold War. At every Alliance Summit since 2014, Allies have taken additional decisions to reinforce NATO's deterrence and defence posture (the Readiness Action Plan and Very High Readiness Joint Task Force in 2014; enhanced forward presence on NATO's eastern flank in 2016; the NATO Readiness Initiative and update of the NATO Command Structure in 2018). NATO also declared cyber and space to be new operational domains, alongside air, land and sea. Allies have also agreed that in cases of hybrid aggression, NATO could decide to invoke article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of a conventional armed attack. Moreover, at the 2021 NATO Summit the Allies decided to take forward NATO's new military strategy through the implementation of two significant military concepts. The deterrence and defence concept (DDA) provides a single, coherent framework to contest, deter and defend against the Alliance's main threats in a multi-domain environment, and strengthens NATO's preparedness to address challenges, particularly pervasive instability and strategic shocks. The warfighting concept (NWCC) provides a long-term vision for maintaining and developing NATO's decisive military edge. The 2022 Strategic Concept should properly reflect all these collective defence building blocks. It should also help to build deterrence into IQ within Allies and in NATO; ensure a coherent and proactive approach across an Alliance of multiple decision-making centres; and appropriately emphasise the roles of forward presence, reinforcement, readiness and enablement. The 2022 Strategic Concept should also confirm that NATO needs a proactive deterrence in peacetime to pose strategic dilemmas to adversaries, offer asymmetric options, and change the balance of advantage in our favour in advance of any crisis. Finally, it should reiterate the Allies' commitment to maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile capabilities for deterrence and defence, and to the 2014 Defence Investment Pledge in its entirety.

Italian Army - An Ariete main battle tank from the 4th Tank Regiment and a Canadian Army LAV III vehicle during exercise "Silver Arrow" in Latvia in September 2019. Author: Italian Army


ELEMENTS OF NATO'S DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE IN 2020
Air Policing
Mission
Securing the airspace of the eastern flank of NATO
Location
Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania
Contributing Nations
Belgium (Šiauliai, Lithuania)
Canada (Constanța, Romania)
France (Ämari, Estonia)
Germany (Ämari, Estonia)
Italy (Šiauliai, Lithuania)
Poland (Ämari, Estonia)
Portugal (Malbork, Poland)
Spain (Šiauliai, Lithuania)
UK (Šiauliai, Lithuania)
US (Ignatievo, Bulgaria)
Iceland Peacetime Preparedness
Mission
Protecting Iceland's airspace
Location
Iceland
Contributing Nations
Italy
Norway
US
AWACS patrols over Eastern Europe
Mission
Patrolling the skies over Eastern Europe
Contributing Nations & NATO Assets
France
Turkey
UK
NATO AWACS aircraft
NATO Force Integration Units
Mission
Facilitating the rapid deployment of NATO forces
Location
Bulgaria Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia
Contributing Nations
27 Allies and partner nations
Enhanced NATO Response Force
Mission
Ready to deploy at short notice for crisis management or collective defence
Location
Netherlands Poland Spain UK
Contributing Nations
Enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF): 26 Allies
Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF): 26 Allies
Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Mission
Supporting decision-makers with timely information and intelligence
Contributing Nations & NATO Assets
Denmark
Portugal
US
NATO - AGS, AWACS aircraft
NATO's Forward Presence
Mission
Strengthening NATO's deterrence and defence
Location
Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania
Contributing Nations
25 Allies
NATO Members
Key NATO and Allied multinational exercises
Standing Naval Forces
Mission
Providing the Alliance with a continuous naval presence
Location
The Atlantic Ocean, the Baltic, Black, Mediterranean and North Seas
NATO Assets
NATO - Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMG1 & 2), Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMG1 & 2)
Framework for the South: Regional Hub for the South
Mission
Improving regional understanding and anticipation of threats emanating from the south
Location
Joint Force Command Naples
Contributing Nations
22 Allies contribute with Voluntary National Contributions and reassigned JFC Naples staff
Ballistic Missile Defence
Mission
Protecting NATO's populations, territory and forces
Location
Germany Poland Romania Spain Turkey
NATO Assets
United States (Rota, Spain)* - US Aegis BMD-capable ships
United States (Deveselu, Romania) - Aegis Ashore
United States (Kürecik, Turkey) - BMD tracking sensor
United States (Redzikowo, Poland) - Aegis Ashore (under construction)
NATO (Ramstein, Germany) - Allied Air Command
Support and Assurance for Turkey
Mission
Reinforcing air defences and providing tailored assurance
Location
Turkey
Contributing Nations
Spain (Adana, Turkey) - Surface-to-air missile batteries
NATO Assets
NATO (Konya, Turkey) - AWACS surveillance aircraft
Allies also contribute through increased Standing Naval Forces port calls, participation in exercises and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance activities.

- The 2010 Strategic Concept underlined NATO's unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. The 2022 Strategic Concept should confirm that NATO provides the framework within which Allies can work and train together, in order to plan and conduct multinational crisis management operations. However, the 2022 Strategic Concept should also set a realistic level of ambition, based on the lessons learned from NATO's operational engagement in Afghanistan. The potential way ahead for NATO should be based on the assumption that prevention is better than intervention. The Alliance should strengthen its ability to provide training and capacity building support to partners, recognising that conflict, other security developments and pervasive instability in NATO's neighbourhood directly impact Allied security. This approach should be underpinned by a strengthened civil preparedness among both Allies and partners. Finally, the 2022 Strategic Concept should reconfirm the clear link between NATO crisis management and article 5 operations. This should lead to a renewed emphasis on collective defence within the NATO Crisis Response System: the overarching process that articulates NATO's crisis management role.



- The 2010 Strategic Concept added cooperative security as a core task. This approach reflected the unfounded optimism about a cooperative Russia, represented also by the misguided efforts to reset relations with Moscow after the 2008 Russian-Georgian war. Based on the current and foreseeable strategic environment, the 2022 Strategic Concept will have to adapt the character and content of this core task, including its name, which does not reflect the strategic reality. Cooperative security today should be translated into ways and means of establishing partnerships for shared security; "partnerships for shared security" could also become the new name of the core task. This should be achieved by building two-way partnerships with those countries and international organisations – first and foremost the European Union – that can substantially and demonstrably help NATO address its strategic priorities. The 2022 Strategic Concept should clearly underline that partnership policy is not a goal in itself, but a means to enhance Allied security. For its advancing work on cross-cutting challenges, NATO should make more use of thematic rather than only geographic groupings. The same logic should apply to the Allied contributions to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The 2022 Strategic Concept should confirm that the basic goal of the Alliance's arms control policy is to enhance security and stability at the balanced level of forces and armaments consistent with the requirements of the strategy of deterrence. It should also reconfirm the agreed Allied guiding principles in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation: security, stability and verification. Finally, the 2022 Strategic Concept should put additional emphasis on the Open Door policy, which is a founding principle of the North Atlantic Treaty. The enduring attractiveness of membership to non-member countries testifies to NATO's success as an alliance.

Allied Guiding Principles in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation, Alliance's Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament, 29-30 May 1989

The members of the Alliance will be guided by the following principles:

- ***Security:*** *Arms control should enhance the security of all Allies. Both during the implementation period and following implementation, the Allies' strategy of deterrence and their ability to defend themselves, must remain credible and effective. Arms control measures should maintain the strategic unity and political cohesion of the Alliance, and should safeguard the principle of the indivisibility of Alliance security by avoiding the creation of areas of unequal security. Arms control measures should respect the legitimate security interests of all states and should not facilitate the transfer or intensification of threats to third party states or regions.disagreements. Allies urge China to engage meaningfully in dialogue, confidence-building, and transparency measures regarding its nuclear capabilities and doctrine. Reciprocal transparency and understanding would benefit both NATO and China.*

- ***Stability:*** *Arms control measures should yield militarily significant results that enhance stability. To promote stability, arms control measures should reduce or eliminate those capabilities which are most threatening to the Alliance. Stability can also be enhanced by steps that promote greater transparency and predictability in military masters. Military stability requires the elimination of options for surprise attack and for large-scale offensive action. Crisis stability requires that no state has forces of a size and configuration which, when compared with those of others, could enable it to calculate that it might gain a decisive advantage by being the first to resort to arms. Stability also requires measures which discourage destabilising attempts to re-establish military advantage through the transfer of resources to other types of armament. Agreements must lead to final results that are both balanced and ensure equality of rights with respect to security.*

- ***Verifiability:*** *Effective and reliable verification is a fundamental requirement for arms control agreements. If arms control is to be effective and to build confidence, the verifiability of proposed arms control measures must, therefore, be of central concern for the Alliance. Progress in arms control should be measured against the record of compliance with existing agreements. Agreed arms control measures should exclude opportunities for circumvention.*

- The three core tasks should be supported by an overarching goal of enhancing Allied resilience. Resilience is an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence, but remains vital also in crisis management and partnerships for shared security. Therefore, the 2022 Strategic Concept should reaffirm Allied commitments to strengthen national and collective resilience; this is firmly anchored in the Washington Treaty, particularly article 3. Resilience should be perceived as the Allied first line of defence. More resilient countries have fewer vulnerabilities that can be used as leverage or targeted by adversaries. Therefore, resilience is an important aspect of deterrence by denial: persuading an adversary not to attack, by convincing it that an attack will not achieve its intended objectives. Resilient societies also have a greater propensity to bounce back after crises: they tend to recover more rapidly and are able to return to pre-crisis functional levels with greater ease than less resilient societies.

North Macedonia joined the Alliance on 27 March 2020 as NATO's 30th member. The Allies are committed to keeping NATO's door open to Western Balkan partners that wish to join the Alliance, share its values and are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership. Author: NATO

2021 Brussels Summit Strengthened Resilience Commitment

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance, affirm that national and collective resilience are an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and the effective fulfilment of the Alliance's core tasks, and vital in our efforts to safeguard our societies, our populations and our shared values.

2. Today, we renew and strengthen the commitment we made in 2016 in Warsaw by further enhancing our national and collective resilience and civil preparedness in an increasingly complex security environment.

3. Our commitment to strengthen our national and collective resilience is firmly anchored in the Washington Treaty, in particular Article 3, which states that Allies, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. Our commitment is based on the indivisibility of our security and underpins our solidarity and commitment to defend one another.

4. Resilience is a national responsibility and a collective commitment. NATO's baseline requirements for national resilience, which we keep updated to reflect emerging challenges and priorities, provide a comprehensive framework to support the effective enablement of our armed forces and of NATO's three core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. We have made good progress towards achieving these requirements and we commit to intensify our efforts.

5. Under NATO 2030, we have agreed today to enhance our resilience. Noting that resilience remains a national responsibility, we will adopt a more integrated and better coordinated approach, consistent with our collective commitment under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to reduce vulnerabilities and ensure our militaries can effectively operate in peace, crisis and conflict. Allies will develop a proposal to establish, assess, review and monitor resilience objectives to guide nationally-developed resilience goals and implementation plans. It will be up to each individual Ally to determine how to establish and meet national resilience goals and implementation plans, allowing them to do so in a manner that is compatible with respective national competences, structures, processes and obligations, and where applicable those of the EU.

6. The COVID-19 pandemic has severely tested our nations and our resilience. Our response has underlined the importance of civil-military engagement and cooperation, and demonstrated the vital roles that our armed forces play in supporting our societies. We are drawing important lessons for the future, which will help shape our preparation for, and response to other such major crises.

7. We are addressing threats and challenges to our resilience, from both state and non-state actors, which take diverse forms and involve the use of a variety of tactics and tools. These include conventional, non-conventional and hybrid threats and activities; terrorist attacks; increasing and more sophisticated malicious cyber activities; increasingly pervasive hostile information activities, including disinformation, aimed at destabilising our societies and undermining our shared values; and attempts to interfere with our democratic processes and good governance. Our commitment in Warsaw has made us more resilient to these threats and challenges. But we need to do more.

8. NATO and Allies, within their respective authority, also commit now to further strengthening our approach. We will step up efforts to secure and diversify our supply chains, as well as to ensure the resilience of our critical infrastructure (on land, at sea, in space and in cyberspace) and key industries, including by protecting them from harmful economic activities. We will build on our work to address the impact of emerging technologies, to secure next-generation communications systems and to protect technology and intellectual property. We will bolster our efforts to meet challenges to our energy security, and to deal with the impact of natural hazards that are being exacerbated by climate change. We will enhance resilience by strengthening our efforts to invest in robust, flexible and interoperable military capabilities. NATO will further strengthen its own resilience, ensuring our ability to consult, decide and act together. Above all, we will adapt our approach when needed, swiftly and with decisiveness, demonstrating our strength individually and as a unified Alliance.

9. Strengthening our resilience requires a broad approach. We will work across the whole of government, with the private and non-governmental sectors, with programmes and centres of expertise on resilience established by Allies, and with our societies and populations, to strengthen the resilience of our nations and societies. We will do so in an inclusive manner, including through integrating gender perspectives in the context of our Women, Peace and Security policy. We will strengthen public communication as part of our overall approach.

10. As we strengthen our efforts to build resilience, we will continue to work with our partners engaged in similar efforts in order to make the Euro-Atlantic area and our broader neighbourhood more secure. The actions, commitments and legal obligations of individual Allies in other international bodies also contribute to enhancing our resilience. This includes the European Union, with which we will continue to build on the scope for mutually complementary and beneficial coordination in strengthening resilience, and to seek further concrete steps and effective synergies.

11. The foundation of our resilience lies in our shared commitment to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The common values enshrined in the Washington Treaty, which underpin our security, remain as valid today as at NATO's founding. We are taking the necessary steps now, and will in the years to come, to strengthen our resilience. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to defend our populations and territory against any threat, and to uphold our shared values.

- The 2010 Strategic Concept underlined that NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set out in article 4 of the Washington Treaty. The 2022 Strategic Concept should reinforce those provisions by emphasising that Allies must strengthen NATO as a genuine forum for consultation on the major strategic and political issues they face. As the Reflection Group stressed, at all levels, NATO should aspire to become a progenitor and essential forum for debate on the primary security challenges that will define the coming decade.

- The 2022 Strategic Concept should put constant adaptation and modernisation at the centre of the Allied approach to NATO's core tasks and principles. NATO must remain an alliance that constantly modernises and adapts to new threats and challenges.

The NATO Summit in Brussels on 14 June 2021. Author: NATO

Article 9 of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

2.2. Conclusion

- The 2022 Strategic Concept should be clear about the centrality of transatlantic relations, and the firmness of the political and military bonds between Europe and North America. For all its member states NATO should be a point of reference for any discussion that touches upon the Euro-Atlantic security. In fact, no other international organisation, including the European Union, can replace NATO with its core mission of collective defence.

- Three core tasks remain a vital pillar that helps to maintain political solidarity, unity and cohesion between Allies. Yet, the 2022 Strategic Concept should restore collective defence as the task that could be best describe as primus inter pares. Collective defence is the only core tasks that is derived directly from the Washington Treaty.

- The 2022 Strategic Concept should confirm that NATO provides the framework within which Allies can work and train together in order to plan and conduct multinational crisis management operations. Yet, the 2022 Strategic Concept should set a realistic level of ambition, based on the lessons learned from NATO's operational engagement in Afghanistan. Therefore, the potential way ahead for NATO should be based on the assumption that prevention is better than intervention.

- The 2010 Strategic Concept added cooperative security as a core task. This approach reflected the unfounded optimism about cooperative Russia, represented also by the misguided efforts to reset relations with Moscow after the 2008 Russian-Georgian war. Based on the current and foreseeable strategic environment, the 2022 Strategic Concept will have to adapt the character and content of this core task, including its name which does not reflect the strategic reality. In fact, cooperative security today should be translated into ways and means of establishing partnerships for shared security which could also become the new name of the core task.

A U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III carrying hundreds of Afghan citizens from Hamid Karzai International Airport on August 15, 2021.

Chapter III

Strategic Adaptation to New Challenges

Members of the Group:

- **Radovan Javorčík** – Ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the United States, Slovakia
- **Robert Pszczel** – Senior Fellow of Casimir Pulaski Foundation, Head of NATO Information Office in Moscow (2010-15), Poland
- **Zoltán Nagy** – Permanent Representative of Hungary to NATO, Hungary
- **Matúš Halás** – Deputy Research Director at the Institute of International Relations (IIR), Czech Republic

Coordinator:

- **Matej Spišák** – Research Fellow, Slovak Security Policy Institute

Background: NATO Adaptation

A famous quote, ascribed to Charles Darwin, states that "It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is most adaptable to change". Adaptation is an inevitable process for all individuals, societies, and organisations that have the ambition to survive in an ever-changing environment. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is no different. Thanks to the wording and spirit of the Washington Treaty, as well as habits of collective self-reflection developed over seven decades, NATO is an organisation capable of constant adaptation. A rapidly changing security environment, new threats and challenges, transformations generated by a globalised world, and plain political expediency, push the Alliance forward in the never-ending process of adaptation. It is no coincidence that the need for a new Strategic Concept, planned for summer 2022, has been recognised by all Allies. NATO, as well as all its member states, clearly see that there are new challenges that demand a reaction from the organisation. Chapter 1 of this paper has already identified several of these challenges. One of the most important, reflected in the Brussels Summit Communiqué of 2021, is the more assertive role of China. Its growing influence and presence in the international arena need to be digested by the Alliance as a whole. Also, in the last couple of years the relationship between the Alliance and the Russian Federation has hit one of its worst points. Russia conducts aggressive actions against Alliance states, clearly threatening Euro-Atlantic security. Besides traditional challenges, NATO members have to grapple with the security implications of new technologies, including emerging and disruptive ones that might potentially be used for malicious purposes. Hybrid, cyber, and other asymmetric threats, or even global pandemics such as Covid-19 – the Alliance has to take all of these into consideration and respond effectively. Inaction is simply not an option. Year by year, climate change is becoming more serious and tangible, working as a threat multiplier with its impact on security as well as on other parts of our everyday lives. These are only some of the issues that should shape the actions, thinking, and vision of future NATO.[1]

[1] Brussels Summit Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Article 33. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 14 June 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm

Difficult as it may be for NATO to wrap its collective head around all the current and potential challenges and threats, it would not be the first time the Alliance has had to adapt to serious international changes. Its focus and military posture have swung according to the security environment. The "NATO 2030: United for a New Era" report clearly states: "NATO's longevity and success have been rooted in its ability to adapt to changing strategic circumstances." This report and other documents also indicate that there have been many important moments in the history of the Alliance when it had to adapt and fast. Before 1989, NATO was predominantly focused on territorial defence, although one of the famous Washington Treaty articles emphasised values, the rule of law, and economic development. After the end of the Cold War, however, NATO started to build partnerships with various countries, including through the Partnership for Peace program. It kept its open door policy to welcome new member states that fulfilled the criteria needed to join the Alliance. Reflecting on events in former Yugoslavia, it had to deal with the dilemma "out of the area or out of business", pivoting towards expeditionary missions and operations. Another important moment in the history of NATO was the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It was the first and so far only time in the Alliance's history that Article 5 had been invoked. The mere fact that non-state actors such as terrorist organisations were capable of causing such security havoc inside of an Alliance member state forced NATO to adapt its stance. Last but not least, there is still a very vivid memory of what happened in Ukraine in 2014 and what Russia continues to do to this sovereign country and some others. The return of geopolitical competition costed Ukraine control over part of its territory but also motivated the Alliance to improve its deterrence and defence, through the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP)[2] and Readiness Action Plan (RAP).[3] Since the Warsaw Summit of 2016, NATO has gone through a deep military adaptation. The aim was not only to get it "back to fit for purpose" but also to strike a balance between territorial defence and projecting stability in the periphery.

Today, NATO faces new challenges and needs to adapt to them. Each Strategic Concept (SC) is always developed in a specific context. For example, that of 1999 was dominated by the discussion about out-of-area operations (vide the Kosovo air operation). The current (2010) SC focuses a lot on the relationship with Russia, as well as emerging challenges such as terrorism; issues that were major headlines more than 10 years ago and remain topical today. The final text of the new SC will no doubt be influenced by the painful lessons generated by the tragic end of the Afghanistan mission. This means that, while the guidelines for the document were agreed at the NATO Brussels summit in June this year (vide the paragraphs devoted to NATO 2030), some of the assumptions on the structure and potential content may have to be revisited, in order to reflect the most recent considerations. A message should go out that NATO is drawing lessons from recent experiences. In this context, some of the recommendations contained in the expert group report to the Secretary General (SG) from November 2020 could prove useful.

Many organisational changes to the military command structure have already been implemented during a previous gradual adaptation, as with improvements to the defence and deterrence posture. A more profound adaptation is needed as regards strategic challenges internally and externally. One way to strengthen internal cohesion could be by doing more things together globally. In other words, NATO will have to face global threats and challenges.

[2] Reflection Group, NATO 2030: United for a New Era, 25 November 2020, 7-8, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf

[3] NATO, Readiness Action Plan, 15 July 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_119353.htm



3.1. Strategic Adaptation

3.1.1. Future institutional framework and decision-making process

- Before discussing things that have to be adapted, there should be a clear agreement on what elements should remain unchanged. One of the "untouchables" is the Washington Treaty itself, as the source of legitimacy and functioning of the Alliance.

- Political acquis – that is, political commitments already entered into – should be kept. Post-1989 members of NATO had to formally sign up to this acquis: respect for the rule of law, ability to build consensus, and solidarity.

- As it has been since the creation of the Alliance, the decision-making process in NATO is based on consensus. In the European Union, discussions about possible changes in the decision-making process are fully ongoing and qualified majority voting has become the norm there in several areas. Similarly, there are voices advocating for changes in the decision-making process in the Alliance; others claim that the decision-making process should remain intact.

- However, the North Atlantic Council, as the only body that derives its powers from the Treaty itself, cannot and should not dispense with the principle of consensus as the only rule for decision-taking. It should be seen as the primary source of decision-making and decision-shaping. In most cases, it is not the consensus rule which is a problem, but the implementation of agreed policies.

- To reiterate, there is no need to change the consensus-based decision-making process. NATO must preserve it at all levels as the Alliance's major operating principle and a force for unity. However, the Alliance could consider some improvements to the manner in which the implementation of agreed decisions is undertaken.

- A similar opinion regarding the consensus-based decision-making process was also provided by the Reflection Group appointed by the Secretary General. As the report states, "decision-making in NATO has an important bearing on political cohesion. The principle of consensus is a cornerstone of the Alliance that guarantees the ability of all members, irrespective of size, to decisively influence outcomes."[4]

- Stemming from the recommendations of the Reflection Group, NATO should not change how decisions are made but instead should focus on efforts to "ensure that consensus-based decisions are implemented."[5]

- Improving NATO's ability to act, by enabling coalitions of the willing within the Alliance and discouraging single-country blockages (especially those driven by bilateral considerations), or raising the threshold for a single-country blockage at the ministerial level, would be helpful. The V4 should support these proposals, provided that the principle of consensus is preserved.

- Any introduction of the idea of majority voting or consensus-minus-one might prove divisive, and the discussion itself could weaken NATO. The efficiency of the process could however be improved, for example by advertising the possibilities of faster decision-tracks, such as more delegated authorities for the Secretary General, pre-authorisation for military commanders, the introduction of time limits in crises, and more.

- If this principle is accepted, various issues can be tackled. First of all, the Strategic Concept should spell out clearly the primacy of NATO's consultation process on hard defence. Some ideas from the experts' report to the Secretary General could be used in this part; for example, a political pledge to "refrain from politically motivated blockage involving matters external to NATO"[6] or more frequent consultations at different levels.

- As in other parts of the Strategic Concept, the document should be as concrete and unambiguous as politically possible. The objective would be to tie individual Allies to consultations, not only in general but to create political pressure to encourage them to consult on matters with key security implications of interest to all. Examples may include consultations on relations with China and Russia, energy security, or arms control. The more the Strategic Concept discusses these ideas in detail, the better the overall effect might be in practice.

- Consultation must be at the core of political adaptation. This includes adherence to the "political acquis" – the rule of law, respect for fundamental freedoms and judicial process – as well as such topics as Women, Peace, and Security; human security; climate change; energy security; technological superiority; resilience; and other matters requiring collective reflection in the Alliance.

- The three core tasks of NATO should remain – collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. The focus should be on going back to basics, amplifying the Alliance's strengths, and fixing language which is clearly outdated.

- The three core tasks are the guarantee of NATO's unity and cohesion. They must reappear unchanged in the new Strategic Concept, to ensure unity and solidarity among the member states. Preferably, there should be no prioritisation within them, even though collective defence will always remain the indispensable objective and raison d'être of the Alliance.

[4] Reflection Group, NATO 2030, 60.

[5] Ibid., 61.

[6] Ibid., 51.

COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

CRISIS MANAGEMENT



COOPERATIVE SECURITY

3.1.2. New competences, domains, special interests, and tools to tackle new challenges

- It is unlikely that the competences of NATO could be modified through the Strategic Concept, as it is meant to be a document valid for many years. Specific mandates usually require case-by-case decisions to be taken in specific timeframes. What could be done is to introduce a new paragraph highlighting the fact that member states reserve the right to agree on new NATO competencies in areas which cannot be determined in advance, but which may be required by the development of a security situation affecting the Euro-Atlantic area. However, this will inevitably have to be in line with international law and commitments already undertaken by the Alliance.

- NATO should consider new domains of operation. No domain should be taken away as a possible area of interest and operation. Importantly, the balance of domains must reflect security environment and strategic foresight.

- Many of the emerging challenges are already covered in the existing documents. The new Strategic Concept should explain their rationale in a coherent way. This mainly applies to challenges such as cyber, emerging, and disruptive technologies (including artificial intelligence); space policy; and climate change.

- Resilience is a candidate for a more ambitious departure. The idea seems to command consensus and it may offer a neat avenue for linking potential elements of NATO policy towards Russia and China.

- As we are witnessing a comeback of political-military geography in international discourse, perhaps the Strategic Concept could spell out areas of special interest to NATO. Besides the Atlantic, regions such as the Balkans, the Arctic, the Baltic and Black Seas, the Mediterranean Sea, and North Africa could be explicitly mentioned.

- NATO is facing distinct threats from all strategic directions. Russia's behaviour could pose a threat to Euro-Atlantic security. At the same time, there are different threats emanating from the South: pervasive instability, terrorism, illegal migration. For some member states, these are more prominent. Therefore, NATO must maintain its 360-degree approach.

- A separate chapter could be devoted to Strategic Communications. It should clearly explain that one of NATO's priorities will be communicating its policies to the general public in the member states, and that Allies will continue pushing back against disinformation and propaganda. A good example of using the Strategic Concept for this purpose would be a reiteration of those domains where Article 5 could be invoked, including traditional domains, as well as cyberspace, hybrid warfare, and space.

- Agreed NATO policies and precedents point the way towards those domains or actions (e.g., cyber or hybrid) that may generate or trigger responses in terms of Article 5. However, this does not mean that other domains may not enter the picture in the future. This is something that can be done in order to create strategic dilemmas for NATO's adversaries, and not just react to gameplays set by others.

- Some reform ideas also have important consequences for internal security matters and domestic politics. Whether we speak about establishing NATO's equivalent of DARPA, or the need to coordinate efforts related to emerging and disruptive technologies, the associated consequences will need careful consideration. Any defence research agency or possible coordination of policies dealing with new technologies might influence the functioning of the internal EU market. This might require close cooperation with the EU on related legal issues; as a minimum, the language used in the Strategic Concept should be synergised with relevant passages of the EU's Strategic Compass.

- The existing language on the range of military tools should be the starting point for any debate: NATO must remain a defensive alliance, but with an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO must remain a nuclear alliance.

- NATO is a regional organisation with a global approach and outlook. As was mentioned in the introduction, the Alliance should take a more global approach, but it must preserve its Euro-Atlantic focus. A more global approach does not have to automatically translate into global action.

- NATO must develop competences to tackle cyber and hybrid threats, emerging and disruptive technologies, and the consequences of climate change. There should therefore be a discussion about a civil-military accelerator to support the invention of new, dual-use technologies and a new Innovation Fund to boost start-ups. The Alliance must focus more on improving resilience, becoming a champion among security organisations in tackling climate change, and consolidating its role in training and advising the security forces of partner countries.

3.1.3. Partnerships

- The three core tasks remain vital pillars for maintaining political solidarity, unity and cohesion between the Allies. However, the 2022 Strategic Concept should restore collective defence as the task that could be best described as primus inter pares. Collective defence is the only core task that is derived directly from the Washington Treaty. Up to now, as many as five out of the seven Strategic Concepts in NATO's history have been collective defence centric. Collective defence should therefore remain at the heart of the Alliance, as set out in article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

- Another important aspect of NATO's adaptation that needs to be taken into consideration is partnerships. In recent decades, NATO has invested in partnerships with states and organisations around the world, based on a sense of shared interests. The Alliance has been conducting dialogue and cooperation with many partner countries on a whole range of issues – political and military. The aim of the partnerships is to improve security globally, aiming for a broader international community[7] that might be affected by either an improving or worsening security environment.

- NATO should bear in mind the main objectives of partnerships: to "enhance Euro-Atlantic and international security, peace and stability; promote regional security and cooperation; facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation on issues of common interest, including international efforts to meet emerging security challenges; prepare interested eligible nations for NATO membership; promote democratic values and institutional reforms, especially in the defence and security sector; enhance support for NATO-led operations and missions; enhance awareness of security developments including through early warning, with a view to preventing crises; and build confidence and achieve better mutual understanding, including about NATO's role and activities, in particular through enhanced public diplomacy."[8]

- The new Strategic Concept brings an opportunity to reconsider and adapt partnerships, to link them more firmly to the interests of the Alliance. NATO should still think about capacity-building and resilience support as well as priorities when it comes to partnerships, for example in the case of hybrid attacks that are aimed at NATO's partners. In addition, NATO "should accelerate internal consultations on China and bring partners in early and often on topics of mutual concern" and more effectively talk to its partners about mutual expectations.[9]

- In a security environment that is once again defined by geopolitical competition and an international system less stable and predictable than it used to be,[10] the Alliance needs to project its power and influence, and contribute to the security of the international arena through partnerships with various states. Some partnerships already exist, others could be initiated, and some need to be reconsidered when it comes to their form. However, this should be determined on the basis of the behaviour of the respective states.

NATO COM JFC Brunssum, General Domröse, speaks with members of the multinational brigade during a visit in Santa-Margarida, Portugal, during JOINTEX 15 as part of NATO exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE 15 on November 1, 2015 Author: Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, CC BY-SA 2.0

[7] NATO, Partnerships: projecting stability through cooperation, 25 August 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84336.htm

[8] Ibid.

[9] Aronsson, Lisa and Swaney, Brett. "Three priorities for NATO partnerships in a contested world", Atlantic Council (June 14, 2021). https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/three-priorities-for-nato-partnerships-in-a-contested-world/

[10] Shea, Jamie. "NATO in the Era of Global Complexity", Carnegie Europe (28 November, 2019). https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/nato-in-era-of-global-complexity-pub-80417

- NATO's partnerships have continuously evolved over time. NATO should continue to work closely with like-minded nations and organisations, but it should also develop its partnerships with less like-minded nations with an interest-driven approach (described below).

- The principle of constructive self-interest could be introduced. Each partner that helps to fulfil NATO goals, especially maintaining the international rule-based orde), can count on a close and productive relationship with NATO.

- Membership in NATO has frequently followed from initial partnerships. The V4 should remain a pro-enlargement group within the Alliance. The open door policy should be unchanged, as enshrined in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty: accession must remain an issue solely for the aspirant and NATO. However, it should remain a merit-based process. Perhaps the Strategic Concept, while reiterating these principles, could devote a bit of space to spelling out the benefits of the enlargement process undertaken since the end of the Cold War.

- When it comes to emerging and disruptive technologies, NATO should also think about its partnerships in terms of added value. This also applies to the possibility of setting norms regarding these technologies. Therefore, the Alliance should look for possible cooperation with its partners in the area of research, and also include public-private partnerships, mainly in terms of sharing lessons learned.[11]

- The Alliance should keep working on a stronger partnership with Ukraine, as this country de facto performs the role of a security flank on NATO's eastern border, bearing the brunt of aggression that could otherwise be directed at NATO member states. Despite the Minsk Agreements, Moscow continues to conduct activities that aim to destabilise Ukraine.[12]

- While most people would agree that the potential of EU-NATO cooperation has not been realised to a satisfactory extent, changing this will remain a rather complex task. Although the meaningful division of labour and cooperation between the EU and NATO is probably the single most important factor in providing security for Europe, the lack of political will to resolve problematic issues at various levels can hardly be resolved by a single document. For example, an idea to enable full involvement of non-EU Allies in various European defence initiatives (e.g., PESCO and EDF) is not mirrored by reciprocal commitments.

- The new Strategic Concept should avoid proposals that could have negative implications for the legal obligations binding Allies who are also EU members (and also for the EU internal market). Instead, it should support efforts to strengthen European defence capacity as long as they preserve NATO's political cohesion and its primacy in transatlantic security. That is one of the best ways to achieve better and fairer burden-sharing.

- While agreed areas of cooperation with the EU should be advertised and promoted, at the same time, NATO has to insist on its unique responsibility for hard security in the transatlantic area. The same should apply to EU projects which offer tangible hopes for increased defence capacity. However, as is the case with the strategic autonomy term in the Brussels summit communique, it may be prudent to recommend that the Strategic Concept does not directly refer to it. A lot of course will depend on how the EU discussion on Strategic Compass progresses.

- All in all, the EU-NATO relationship is vital for transatlantic security. For this reason, the organisations should work to achieve beneficial relations, and enhance cooperation between them. What might also help is the idea of a "NATO-EU summit at heads of state and government level (…) held at least once a year".[13]

[11] Aronsson and Brett, "Three priorities for NATO partnerships in a contested world".

[12] Lindley-French, Julian et al., "GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative. One Alliance? Change Drivers in a New Strategic Environment", Globsec (May 2017). https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/GLOBSEC-NATO-ADAPTATION-INITIATIVE_-_one_alliance_interim_report.pdf

[13] NATO, Adapting NATO to an unpredictable and fast-changing world. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/02/19/adapting-nato-to-an-unpredictable-and-fast-changing-world/index.html

3.1.4. Military structure

- Following the Warsaw Summit in 2016, the military part of NATO adaptation went fully ahead and made substantial progress in preparing for challenges that the Allies are facing and might face in the near future. The new NATO Command Structure, as well as its upgraded force structure, military strategy, and operational strategies, are in place. All acknowledge that area of interest for defence and deterrence reaches beyond the physical soil of Allied nations.

- However, this does not mean that NATO defence and deterrence should not be strengthened even further. As one of the Alliance's key tasks is to prevent conflict, one of its priorities must be "enhancing the readiness and responsiveness of NATO conventional forces".[14]

- New features like the NFIU, Assurance Measures, eFP, and tFP will continue to reflect the need for flexibility and adaptability of military posture.

- What must be ensured is the coherence of various efforts. The Eastern and Southern flanks, for example, do not need the same type of military requirements, due to the proximity and intensity of specific threats present in these sub-theatres. They do, however, need a coherence of purpose, to be able to blend together and augment each other when necessary.

- NATO must continue to implement the military adaptation started in 2014 by strengthening its deterrence and defence posture. The process has advanced a lot with the development of a new Military Strategy, the Concept on the Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (the DDA concept), and the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept.

- As has already been mentioned, the Alliance has to undertake the full and balanced implementation of the relevant documents. There is also an agreement to review NATO's force structure with a 360-degree approach. In other words, NATO should not become a sharpened knife that points only at a single challenge or state, such as Russia and China. It must preserve the ability to address the full spectrum of security threats and challenges it is facing in the ever-changing security environment that shapes its actions and policies. To put it simply – NATO as a whole does not have the luxury to choose the threats it must configure itself to face. They all, even if to different degrees, demand an answer.

Family photo of NATO Heads of State and Government taking part in the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw, Author: Andrzej Hrechorowicz - Kancelaria Prezydenta RP

3.1.5. The enhancement of coherence and cohesion

- NATO needs to admit that it consists of a number of member states with their own interests. Therefore, it will not always be possible to achieve complete harmony, and there might be periods when tensions in the organisation are considerably higher.[15]

- Nevertheless, if members of the organisation start to deflect from shared values, this might lead to disunity. This might be exploited by opponents of NATO. Member states should thus once again commit themselves to adhere to the principles of the Alliance.

[14] NATO, Adapting NATO to an unpredictable and fast-changing world.

[15] Ellehuus, Rachel and Morcos, Pierre. "'Lifting Up Our Values at Home': How to Revitalize NATO's Political Cohesion", Center for Strategic and International Studies (12 March, 2021). https://www.csis.org/analysis/lifting-our-values-home-how-revitalize-natos-political-cohesion

- The values of the Alliance matter. This topic is and will be monitored, to determine the degree to which countries meet the high standards underpinning the Alliance's foundations. To tackle genuine problems, some ideas can be offered for situations when member states register serious concerns about the sincerity of any state's attachment to democratic values. While no ally should be subjected to "penalties", the Strategic Concept could restate that when individual members' policies on democratic values cause concern among other allies, this may be a topic of debate in the North Atlantic Council.

- Overall, current recriminations mean that the climate within the Alliance is not ideal. There is talk that the Afghanistan debacle has undermined the validity of key intra-Alliance agreements. However, even if the optics are bad right now, this does not mean that the process of agreeing on a new Strategic Concept has to end badly. The proper lessons from Afghanistan will have to be learned and applied – the Secretary General has already promised such an exercise.

- One of the current priorities is to avoid emotional and irresponsible policy conclusions; above all, the United States turning inwards or Europeans believing in the solutions allegedly offered by the strategic autonomy slogan.

- Today, Washington and Brussels need each other more than ever. The U.S. needs real allies to improve its dented reputation and share more of the burden when it comes to facing up to strategic powers (China and Russia). The ongoing debate in the United States clearly spells out the key preoccupation of the Biden administration – the fear of fighting two conflicts at the same time. Europeans need the United States because Europe's military capabilities remain insufficient to contemplate hard defence on its own.

- In Afghanistan, NATO's unity and coherence have been ensured by the "in together, out together" principle, and a conditions-based approach for the adjustment and withdrawal of our forces. Unfortunately, the approach was not implemented properly towards the end. There have been questions asked about the excessive focus on stabilisation since 2014 (seen, rather incorrectly, as democracy building). However, it was the final, disengagement, phase that received the heaviest criticism (intelligence failure, miscalculation regarding the Taliban takeover, and poor preparations for the evacuation). A structured lessons-learning process is needed.

- NATO's primary challenge these days is to maintain unity and cohesion. Therefore, the V4 countries may be able to represent a balanced view about NATO's future adaptation; both during the implementation of the NATO2030 process and the development of the new Strategic Concept.

- Already there are many new ideas on the table for the strengthening of NATO's cohesion and political consultation role, including the widening of the agenda and some new formats, such as informal meetings of national security advisors. These ideas should be implemented.

- The best approach to enhance coherence would be to spell out – that is, codify – existing policies, to achieve greater stakeholder ownership among allies. A very promising path would be to devote a separate chapter of the Strategic Concept to resilience. This could include presenting this goal as essential and binding, and outlining more rigorous commitments in terms of the level of ambition, common standards, and some novel ways of measuring success (e.g., resilience planning and a review mechanism linked to the NATO defence planning cycle). While the NATO 2030 part of the Brussels summit communique states that resilience goals are a national responsibility, collective resilience is also mentioned.

- Strengthening the resilience of member states is increasing in importance: NATO must take a more integrated approach to this issue. However, we should also keep the necessary balance: it is a collective commitment, but it must remain a primarily national responsibility. For this reason, even if one wants to propose ambitious goals in this respect, it may be wise to think, for example, in terms of voluntary rather than obligatory targets. This is also in order to preserve the integrity of the NATO Defence Planning Process.

3.1.6. Military spending

- The pandemic brought unexpected financial costs for all member states. This might affect the implementation of the burden-sharing pledge for 2% of member states' GDP to be spent on defence.

- Arguments about the 2% commitment are nothing new inside the Alliance. There has been criticism coming from the U.S. for a long time, highlighting a need for more burden-sharing among the Allies. That is understandable, as the U.S. spends a significantly higher proportion of its GDP on defence: 3.7% in 2020, while the average of European NATO member states was only 1.77%.[16] This obvious imbalance has the potential to raise tensions inside of the Alliance.

- Therefore, the 2% commitment should not be abandoned. If it is taken out of the picture, it would be read as an admission that NATO has compromised its credibility, inevitably with negative consequences. It is the precondition of further adaptation and of remedying some persistent capability shortfalls.

- Timing also plays a role, since the 2% target is only supposed to be met in 2024. In general, while achievement of the 2% goal by itself would not translate into real capabilities, without meeting it, the chances of improving the capabilities of European Allies are very low. Therefore, by the time the Strategic Concept text matures, there should be some more concrete decisions on broadened criteria for common funding.

- New solutions already exist to increase the commonly funded NATO budgets, including the military and infrastructure budgets. There is an agreement in principle that a higher ambition requires higher common budgets. This should also follow the 360-degree approach that has already been mentioned.

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AS A SHARE OF GDP (%)		
MEMBER STATE	2019	2021 estimate
GREECE	2.36	3.82
UNITED STATES	3.51	3.52
CROATIA	1.65	2.79
UNITED KINGDOM	2.10	2.29
ESTONIA	2.03	2.28
LATVIA	2.03	2.27
POLAND	1.98	2.10
LITHUANIA	2.00	2.03
ROMANIA	1.85	2.02
FRANCE	1.83	2.01
NORWAY	1.86	1.85
MONTENEGRO	1.33	1.74
SLOVAK REPUBLIC	1.71	1.73
NORTH MACEDONIA	1.16	1.61
HUNGARY	1.25	1.60
TURKEY	1.85	1.57
BULGARIA	3.15	1.56
PORTUGAL	1.38	1.54
GERMANY	1.36	1.53
NETHERLANDS	1.35	1.45
ALBANIA	1.31	1.44
CZECH REPUBLIC	1.16	1.42
DENMARK	1.30	1.41
ITALY	1.18	1.41
CANADA	1.30	1.39
SLOVENIA	1.06	1.28
BELGIUM	0.89	1.12
SPAIN	0.91	1.02
LUXEMBOURG	0.54	0.57

[16] BBC News, Nato summit: What does the US contribute?, 14 June 2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074

- At the same time, it is possible to argue that fulfilling the 2% commitment will not automatically improve the global position of NATO. It might be worthwhile for the Alliance to better plan and invest existing finance to improve its functioning.[17]

3.1.7. Role in preserving the rule-based international order

- Looking at the current 2010 Strategic Concept, the obvious area that requires the most substantial update is the scope and intensity of the security challenges posed by the two leading autocratic powers: Russia and China.

- Beginning with Russia, the passages in the 2010 SC are completely outdated and need a comprehensive rewrite. Russian actions have meant that NATO's hopes for a cooperative security relationship must be postponed for the foreseeable future. The real issue now is to describe the nature of NATO's response to the threat posed by Russia. Specifically, the most valuable contribution that the Strategic Concept could make would be to generate consensus for finally defining Russia as a country behaving as an adversary. This is indispensable for a number of reasons, not least those connected to such specific elements as military posture, defence against hybrid threats, and political solidarity.

- This does not mean closing the door to dialogue, but confirming the reality of a policy choice adopted by Moscow.

- There should be a serious discussion regarding the implementation of the well-established policy of the Alliance, often described as the three Ds (defence, deterrence, and dialogue). There does not seem to be any consensus for any substantial change to that approach. However, the Strategic Concept should be used to communicate to Moscow both the costs of its aggressive stance, and also the opportunities and benefits that it could derive from altering it. NATO should thus preserve the offer of dialogue existing in the NATO-Russia Council mechanisms. The goal of doing everything possible to reduce risks and strengthen transparency, with a view to avoiding miscalculation or accidental conflict, should also be spelled out very clearly.

- Russia is an immediate neighbour of several Allies. Some member states further away from Moscow are increasingly focused on the South and Africa; others are even trying to pivot to Asia and cope with the rise of China. NATO must deal with threats emanating from all directions. In order to facilitate agreement upon a common security picture, it needs a shared net assessment, increased staff rotation, and more frequent Ministerials and meetings of other senior officials with shared expertise, precisely as recommended in the Experts' Report.

- To increase the credibility of NATO's role in maintaining a rule-based international order, China has to be discussed. The initial balance has shifted, but NATO must continue its work to better understand China's behaviour and seek dialogue to exploit potential areas of cooperation.

- China is often labelled one of NATO's most important challenges; therefore, a new chapter on this subject has to be included. NATO needs a specialised approach towards a rising superpower. Allies need to reflect on and ideally further develop the language of the last Summit declarations, thinking of China as a country with which we have opportunities to engage, but also one whose policies and actions in the security field have significant implications for the Alliance.

[17] Cordesman, Anthony H., " NATO: Going From the 2% Non-Solution to Meaningful Planning", Center for Strategic and International Studies (26 June 2019). https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-going-2-non-solution-meaningful-planning

- A different wording will be required to capture the coercive and confrontational aspects of Beijing's approach in a more nuanced manner than in the case of Russia. This includes a recognition that at present we are still holding out our judgment on defining China as an adversary, depending on its policies; for example, on its willingness to engage in arms control and Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs). The role of partnerships is also important here (vide considerations discussed in the subchapter dedicated to that topic).

- Overall, the Alliance must be careful not to overstretch NATO's ambitions. NATO must continue to be a defence organisation with a Euro-Atlantic focus. Within these limits, however, it must stand up for its common values and the security interests of its member states, including through setting high norms and standards for itself and other international organisations. However, it should do so in a reasonable manner, only to the point where it will still be productive. Prime examples include arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, as well as human security.

- NATO is a part of the "political West", so it must play a progressive role in norm-setting. However, when it comes to a coordinated stance in other international organisations (OSCE, UN), there must be awareness that a rationale for developing a common NATO stance should be evaluated with political effectiveness in mind.

- If NATO wants to play a role in maintaining a rule-based order, it must cooperate with and help its partner countries. For example, NATO might strengthen its existing partnerships with countries that share common values. At the same time, the Alliance should motivate and help countries in transition, as it has been doing, and find a way "to penalise Russia and China for assaults against weaker states."[18]

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg meets Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, September 2017. Author: NATO

[18] Von Voss, Alicia and Schimell, Florence. "NATO's Future Role in the Multilateral Rule-Based Order", Carnegie Europe (28 November, 2019). https://carnegieeurope.eu/2019/11/28/nato-s-future-role-in-multilateral-rules-based-order-pub-80412

3.2. Conclusion

- **Decision-making**. The consensus-based process should remain intact. At the moment, it is not the consensus rule that is the problem in most cases, but the implementation of agreed policies. A similar recommendation also came from the Reflection Group, who argued that NATO should not change how decisions are made, but should focus on efforts to "ensure that consensus-based decisions are implemented."[19]

- **Resilience**. NATO must focus more on improving resilience. Even though increasing resilience is a collective commitment, it should remain a national responsibility. For this reason, even if one wants to propose ambitious goals in this respect, it may be wise to think in terms of voluntary rather than obligatory targets. This might also offer an avenue for linking potential elements of NATO's policy towards Russia and China.

- **Russia**. The passages on Russia in the 2010 Strategic Concept are now outdated. The new Strategic Concept may make a difference by generating a consensus for finally defining Russia as a country behaving as an adversary. This is indispensable for a number of reasons, not least connected to specific policies such as military posture, hybrid threats, or political solidarity. That does not mean closing doors to possible dialogue, but it would confirm the reality ensuing from Moscow's actions.

- **China**. A new chapter on China has to be introduced, as its growing role and clout are often labeled as among the most important challenges faced by the international order. NATO should focus on determining effective means of restricting the negative impact of this transformation, while not ruling out potential opportunities for engagement. The Strategic Concept could be used to communicate to Beijing that for the time being, NATO is not labeling China as an adversary, but reserving its judgment pending further developments.

- **Military spending**. The 2% commitment made by member states should remain. If it were taken out, this would be read as an admission that NATO has compromised its credibility, inevitably with negative consequences. It is the precondition of further adaptation and of remedying some persistent capability shortfalls.

[19] Reflection Group, NATO 2030, 61.

Chapter IV

Strategic Compass and the EU-NATO relations in the field of security and defence

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Background: How much strategic autonomy does the EU need?

The ongoing pandemic, mounting climate crisis, growing threats from China and Russia and the recent situation in Afghanistan, highlights the need for cohesive action towards the current and future global threats, especially in the realm of security and defence. As the EU assesses the new and increasing threats and challenges, the need to counter these mounting dangers, protect its citizens, and enhance its role as a stronger global partner, the EU wants to take concrete measures to develop its ability to act.

In the wake of the deteriorating transatlantic relationship under former United States President Donald J. Trump, the EU leaders started to look for other options in order to secure their interests, policies, and the multilateral world order that U.S. President Trump has effectively challenged. This debate, however, was not developed over night but was rather an evolution born from the 2016 EU Global Strategy or Council Conclusions from November 2016, where the definition said: "strategic autonomy is the capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible".[20] *It gained momentum after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and was reinforced by Washington's isolationist and unilateralist foreign policy over the past years. President Trump's hot and cold approach towards NATO, motivated the EU Member States to start pooling their resources and work on developing their defence capabilities.*

However, as outlined further in this chapter, fear among NATO Allies concerns possible duplication of resources and institutions existing within NATO.

[20] European Council, Council conclusions on progress in implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of Security and Defence, 6 March 2017. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/06/conclusions-security-defence/

Competing visions for what EU's strategic autonomy will resemble - whether the EU will follow the "French concept" or the "German approach" calls into question the direction-leading countries like France and Germany on their will to drive the future of EU engagement on security issues. German leadership under Merkel have called for strengthening "the EU's security and defence policy and the European pillar in NATO, rather than build European strategic autonomy under French leadership".[21] While the CEE countries have showed that they value the EU as a positive platform for defence capabilities development – It should not serve as an alternative to NATO.

In her recent State of the Union address, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen gave an impassioned plea to Member States, asking to be a stronger global player, especially in times of great power competition and hyper-competitiveness. Stating that we now live in "an era of regional rivalries and major powers refocusing their attention towards each other".[22] She touched upon the ongoing debate around building a European Defence Union, calling for political will in building the foundation for collective decision-making, improving interoperability, and building up our cyber defences that will be developed in the EU's Strategic Compass next year.

Similar to NATO's Strategic Concept, the EU Strategic Compass aims to serve as a roadmap and an opportunity to close the gap between 'too much rhetoric' and 'too little action' that have characterized the EU's security and defence efforts so far.[23] The Compass may contribute to the development of a "coherent and strategic approach to the existing defence initiatives and will bolster the EU's security and defence policy, taking into account the threats and challenges that the EU is facing".[24]

While on schedule to be ready by March 2022, the process was launched in July 2020, initiated under the German EU Presidency and it is expected to be completed in early 2022, under the French EU Presidency. This is something that the Czech Presidency, held later that year, will certainly have to either implement or further develop. The Compass will aim to provide a detailed political, strategic direction for the EU's security and defence, which can help in "creating a common way of looking at the world, of defining threats and challenges as the basis of addressing them".[25] ***The Compass needs to come up with the right narrative on how Europe wants to be projected not just internally but externally.***

[21] Gotkowska, Justyna, European strategic autonomy or European pillar in NATO? Germany's stance on French initiatives, OWS Commentary, February 2021. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2020-02-21/european-strategic-autonomy-or-european-pillar-nato-germanys

[22] European Commission, 2021 State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen, 16 September 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_21_4701

[23] Zandee, Dick, Adája Stoetman and Bob Deen, The EU's Strategic Compass for security and defence Squaring ambition with reality, Clingendael Report, May 2021, p 1.

[24] Molenaar, Arnout, Unlocking European Defence. In Search of the Long Overdue Paradigm Shift, Instituto Affari Internazionali, 1 January 2021, p. 6.

[25] Stoetman, Adája, European Strategic Autonomy: Seizing The Momentum, Clingendael Report, 11 March 2021. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/european-strategic-autonomy-seizing-momentum#_ftn6

4.1. Strategic Compass and the EU-NATO relations

4.1.1. EU added value in the defence sphere

- Coming to an consensus on unresolved issues such as migration, lack of military cooperation, diverging interpretations of what the rule of law entails, and unpacking the difficulties experienced in agreeing on a common response to mitigate the effects of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemics, climate change and even approaches towards China and Russia, remain the key requirements for the EU's added value.[26] **In short, in order to create a clear compass, EU member states will need to show political will in order to achieve anything discussed within the security and defence sphere.**

- The EU has a lot of untapped potential and a vast portfolio of instruments that can help develop capabilities in the short- and long-term, including cooperating with industry and the tech base, as well as the understanding of the processes required for developing capabilities that include regulations and processes that need to be streamlined to be used to its fullest. **The EU can apply both soft and hard power, and apply it towards the relevant security concerns unique mixture of tools**.[27]

- At the other end of the spectrum, many issues around the EU's strategic responsibility have been questioned, especially as regards such instruments as the EU battlegroups that have never been used. Supporters state that battlegroups are the beginning of an evolution that will eventually lead to a larger force, and thanks to a new EUR 5 billion fund for military operations under the European Peace Facility (EPF), it can defray costs better than the individual battlegroups, which so far have been mainly funded by individual countries.[28] But that question can only be answered in the future.

Migrants crossing into Hungary underneath the unfinished Hungary–Serbia border fence, 25 August 2015. Author: Gémes Sándor/SzomSzed, CC BY-SA 3.0

[26] Daniel Tibor, Daniel, EU added value - a categorical imperative for EU action? Reprot: Realising European added value, European Court of Auditors, 2020, p. 9. https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/JOURNAL20_03/JOURNAL20_03.pdf

[27] Council of the EU, Mozambique: EU sets up a military training mission to help address the crisis in Cabo Delgado, Press Release, 12 July 2021. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/07/12/mozambique-eu-launches-a-military-training-mission-to-help-address-the-crisis-in-cabo-delgado/

[28] Questions & Answers: The European Peace Facility, European External Action Service, May 2021. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/46286/questions-answers-european-peace-facility_en

4.1.2. Military industry cooperation and unification of equipment

- Debate over Europe's limited military capabilities, gaps in technological innovation, lagging defence industrial base, and national defence expenditures have all led to concerns around the "institutional and policy efforts to converge European strategic needs, advocate more coherent and interoperable military capabilities, and avoid further duplication in the research and development (R&D) of weapons systems". The aim was to ensure financial incentives for the EU defence sector and encourage cross-border collaboration, by developing a more integrated and competitive defence industry through providing, as some authors claim, "feasible solutions to improve the EU's strategic autonomy as part of a broader effort to mitigate new internal and external security threats".[29]

- France and Germany took the initiative in these efforts, leading the EU towards establishing the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and other internal security structure such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), which have added to the region's security arsenal by pooling European finances, capacity, and military capabilities in pursuit of European strategic autonomy, forming a stronger pillar of NATO. The EU's European Defence Fund (EDF) marked an unprecedented shift toward a stronger EU approach towards defence industrial policy, specifically with regards to market regulation, capability development and arms export policy, and represented the shift in the way the EU viewed and invested in defence. The EDF would place the EU among the top defence research and technology investors in Europe and ideally encourage more spending by Member States, especially if they use it to get co-financing for some of the projects planned in the PESCO format, under which they can work in smaller groups on more ambitious capability projects. **EU Member States should make full use of all EU defence initiatives so that they can support standardisation and increase interoperability of both forces and equipment in missions and operations in both the EU and NATO context.**

- One of PESCO's commitments states that participating Member States should increase and aim at 2% of defence expenditure on defence R&D. This target helps NATO too, as it enhances R&D of NATO Member States as well. Currently, 38 out of 46 PESCO projects are fully in line with NATO Defence Planning Process priorities. PESCO was created to eliminate the fragmentation in weapon systems in Europe and to standardise the systems, so that the armed forces of EU Member States are more interoperable. This interoperability is very important for missions and operations in both the EU and NATO context. PESCO can fill in the gaps between NATO capabilities, especially as the fourth wave of PESCO projects is poised to come out with new ideas in November 2021. It can further eliminate fragmentation on defence issues and further standardise systems in order to achieve more interoperability both within the EU and NATO. **In addition, the EU can connect its Multiannual Financial Framework, as part of Military Mobility to help fund infrastructure projects that are identified as improved and useful for NATO.**

Romanian Air Force MiG-21 LanceR C in flight. LanceR variant planes were upgraded by Israeli firm Elbit Systems to modernise the old Soviet airframe and to make its equipment more compatible with NATO standards (the old SRZO-2 IFF transponder was replaced with IFF Plessey that is compatible with NATO IFF Mk. 10 transponder, according to STANAG 41-93. Author: Cristian Ghe, CC BY 2.0

[29] Csernatoni, Raluca, EU Security and Defence Challenges: Toward a European Defence Winter?, Carnegie Europe, 11 June, 2020. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/06/11/eu-security-and-defence-challenges-toward-european-defence-winter-pub-82032

- The EU welcomed its first CARD Report in 2020. It identified the opportunities for EU Member States in which they can cooperate. CARD is thus a tool that helps Member States to enhance cooperation with other Member States, and can be used to start new collaboration projects (e.g. in PESCO framework).

- Through developing monetary incentives, the EU has been attempting to address the gaps within the European defence technological and industrial base, but has also seen limitations within Member States, especially on future mission objectives. Experts have called for the EU to think longer-term and not get trapped into a "CSDP silo". Instead, the EU needs to operate with purpose. For example, the EU activities could contribute towards sharing the defence burden with the US, especially on regional and out-of-area operations with direct security, economic or political impact for the EU. **In short, the EU should focus, identify, assess, and react to crises in its neighbourhood and evaluate what tools are already in place like PESCO, CARD and EDF rather than implementing new processes.**

4.1.3. Military mobility

- The need to protect EU citizens from internal and external threats spurred the awareness around obstacles that may prevent or impede armed forces from moving effectively and swiftly across borders during crisis conditions. Military mobility aims to harmonise rules across EU Member States and to explore the potential of a civilian-military approach to infrastructure development.

- Military Mobility is a flagship of NATO-EU cooperation, and the EU has a lot to offer in this area. The measures taken to "correct this strategic vulnerability was military mobility, which enacted existing regulatory, administrative, and infrastructure inconsistencies and impediments across the territory of the EU that significantly hamper military exercises and training".[30] This has been achieved by funding dual use transport infrastructure and simplifying diplomatic clearances and customs rules, its aim is also to be used beyond the EU area, to support missions and operations under the CSDP. This contribution, has provided the EU with the ability to leverage existing policies in the civilian realm and apply it towards the military, which has created closer collaboration between different bodies at the EU level, including NATO however, it is worth noting the concerns around the speed in which this process takes. **Military mobility has been described as an "essential piece in the EU's ambition to become a stronger global actor".[31] By Connecting Europe Facility within the Multiannual Financial Framework of the EU (2021-2027) – funding aimed at improving infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.) is a practical tool for EU Member States that are also NATO Allies.** Led by the Netherlands, military mobility was joined by the United States, Norway and Canada earlier this year (this was first PESCO project after the rules for third states participation in PESCO projects were agreed by PESCO participating Member States in November 2020). The project has become necessary because NATO "does not have the vocation to be building bridges and roads, rail connections [and] working on mechanisms for simplifying the bureaucratic and administrative procedures for transporting equipment from one country to another".[32]

- The US joining just a few months ago highlights not only the rekindling of the transatlantic partnership. This also falls in line with the Visegrad countries outlook and concerns around Russia and the need to continued support in countering any threats from the East, especially with Ukraine.

[30] Latici, Tania, Military mobility: Infrastructure for the defence of Europe, European Parliament Think Tank Briefing, 25 February, 2020. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2020)646188

[31] Ibid.

[32] Barigazzi, Jacopo, US to join EU project on military mobility, Politico, 5 May, 2021. https://www.politico.eu/article/us-united-states-canada-norway-eu-project-on-military-mobility/

288 Stryker armoured personnel carrier vehicles sit on rail cars awaiting induction transport to the Anniston Army Depot. Author: Mark Cleghorn, CC BY 2.0

4.1.4. Resilience

- The global pandemic has been a key example of why societies, especially democracies, need to invest and continue to build their resilience. At the EU level, the need to mitigate the economic and social impact of the pandemic and to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient, and better prepared for the challenges and opportunities of the green and digital transition, developed into a large-scale financial support for investment and reforms called the NextGenerationEU and outlined in the EU Strategic Agenda 2019-2024.

- While primarily focusing on economic resilience, the EU has been developing and bolstering its security outlook, particularly within the scope of the CSDP and especially in the case of crisis management. From Libya in 2003 to the recent situation in Afghanistan, the ability to assess the situation and react effectively has been a vital component and pitfall of the EU. As the EU faces the reality that war, whether in the field or in cyberspace, it is not out of the question as seen with tensions along its border with Belarus, Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine. **Experts stated that no crisis should go to waste, the pandemic and situation in Afghanistan has given the EU an opportunity to reset the narrative and further invest in its defence, and the Strategic Compass can be projected to global friends and foes, where the EU see itself as a leader.**

- **The EU should look at how NATO has approached resilience, especially the ability for Member States to resist and recover from a major shock such as a natural disaster, failure of critical infrastructure, or a hybrid or armed attack.** In this context, resilience is a "society's ability to resist and recover from such shocks and combines both civil preparedness and military capacity. Civil preparedness is a central pillar of Allies' resilience and a critical enabler for the Alliance's collective defence, and NATO supports Allies in assessing and enhancing their civil preparedness"[33] as embedded in Article 3. NATO has established baseline requirements for national resilience against which Allies can measure their level of preparedness; these requirements reflect the core functions of continuity of government, essential services to the population and civil support to the military.



A member of the Peruvian Army with a K9 enforcing a new curfew in Lima. Author: Ministerio de Defensa del Perú, CC BY 2.0

[33] NATO, Resilience and Article 3, 11 June 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm

- **This is an area where the Strategic Compass can ensure that Member States are equipped with better civilian preparedness tools to reduce potential vulnerabilities.** NATO highlights those military forces, especially those deployed during crises and war, rely on the civilian and commercial sectors for transport, communications, and even basic supplies such as food and water, to fulfil their missions – the EU has the political means to ensure that this is supported and implemented.

- **Strengthened political engagement, capacity building, and resilience enhancing help to confront spill-over threats such as irregular migration, resource scarcity, and a weakly-governed space, will be critical for the EU to address and should be highlighted in the Strategic Compass.**

4.1.5. Cybersecurity

- Cybercrime has become a key challenge to international security. The European Union is confronted with an increasingly challenging threat environment that is difficult to control, track, and defend with conventional military weapons. Cyberwarfare has entered the security paradigm, in recent years, and escalated to a substantial degree with emerging Russian and Chinese state-backed hackers. In turn, initiating attacks against countries to various degrees, including meddling with the very democratic practices of political elections in the West.[34] The borderless nature of cyber space still proves to be a great challenge as it is difficult to catch and prosecute such an attacker, especially if its origins are from a state.

- On 17 May 2019 the Council of the European Union adopted the Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 and Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796 concerning the restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States.[35] The new legislation evolved from the conclusions on a framework for a joint diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities (the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox). It was adopted by the Council in 2017 and set a framework of measures against possible aggressors such as Russia. Based on the Toolbox and its principles, the Council Decision and Regulation of May 2019, form an important step forward to face emerging security threats in cyberspace at the EU level.[36] In the last seven years, almost EUR 5 billion in grant assistance was delivered, with a special emphasis on the resilience against hybrid and cyber threats and disinformation.[37] **The EU's counter-hybrid toolbox is therefore the key to building societal resilience against hybrid attacks, especially protecting critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, and countering disinformation.**

- Cyber defence is one of the areas in which the EU and NATO are strengthening their cooperation. In February 2017, they signed an agreement aimed at strengthening their cooperation and ability to defend Allies from hybrid attacks.[38] The Technical Arrangement on Cyber defence aims to facilitate technical information sharing between NCIRC and CERT-EU to improve cyber incident prevention, detection and response in both organisations. Such cooperation demonstrates how NATO and the EU can work together to enhance shared security. Resiliency in cybersecurity requires all involved countries in which illegal cyber activities are committed, to take the necessary legislative measures on an international level together.

[34] Lucie Kadlecová, "RUSSIAN-SPEAKING Cyber Crime: Reasons behind Its Success," SGOC (The European Review of Organised Crime , 2015), https://standinggroups.ecpr.eu/sgoc/russian-speaking-cyber-crime-reasons-behind-its-success/.

[35] Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/GA/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019D0797.

[36] European Union Establishes a Sanction Regime for Cyber-Attacks," CCDCOE, 2021, https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/european-union-establishes-a-sanction-regime-for-cyber-attacks/.

[37] European Commission, "JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL on EU-Russia Relations - Push Back, Constrain and Engage ," European Commission , June 16, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/joint-communication-eu-russia-relations.pdf, 9.

[38] European Parliament, "Countering Hybrid Threats: EU-NATO Cooperation," European Parliament, March 2017, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599315/EPRS_BRI(2017)599315_EN.pdf.

- The signing of this agreement is an important milestone to enhance NATO and EU cooperation that is also one of the objectives of the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw and the EU Global Strategy.[39] Alongside this, the Strategic Compass aims to provide a framework that will help focus Member States' efforts on security and defence, and that strengthens members' capabilities against hybrid threats, including the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and Helsinki European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, alongside NATO. With NATO's efforts, the EU is supporting Member States in the development of their defence capabilities through PESCO and the EDF.[40]

- **Enhancing the EU´s capabilities to tackle hybrid threats has been an essential aspect of the EU's security agenda in the last five years and will need to be addressed in the Strategic Compass**. Experts stated that a cohesive approach towards countering malign actors will be the next big security challenge, as the next war will likely happen in cyberspace.

4.1.6. EU and NATO partnership in the face of new challenges

- Calling for closer EU and NATO cooperation, EC President von der Leyen recently stated that the EU needs to invest more in the joint-partnership, bolstered by the new EU-NATO Joint Declaration at end of the year. However, von der Leyen stated that the EU needs to do more in ensuring its own security and defence posture. She outlined three areas: providing stability in EU's neighbourhood and across different regions, understanding the nature of the emerging threats including hybrid, cyber-attacks to the growing arms race in space and **capitalising on the EU's position as a "unique security provider" with a strong military and civilian presence that could step into missions where NATO or the UN will not be present**.[41]

- This highlights that while the EU and NATO have different mandates when it comes to the defence and security of the region, their aims, and objectives primarily align and they have in some respects, have been mutually beneficial to each other.

- These exchanges are a concrete step towards closer cooperation but the need for mutual and realistic interests on future engagement and identifying mutual threats such as hybrid threats needs political backing. **The Strategic Compass can offer an opportunity for more cooperation, and enabling a stronger role for the EU in the Euro-Atlantic space has been largely unexplored.** However, experts have warned that the process will require patience to redefine the EU's goals and means for achieving them in synergy with NATO.

Building of the Information Center on NATO and EU, crossing of Shalva Dadiani and Kote Abkhazi streets, Tbilisi, Georgia. Author: Robot8A, CC BY-SA 4.0

[39] ATA, "NATO, EU & INDUSTRY: COOPERATION ON CYBER SECURITY A Transatlantic Exchange of Best Practices ," Atlantic Treaty Association , 2017, http://www.atahq.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/NATO-EU-Industry-Cooperation-on-Cyber-Security-A-Transatlantic-Exchange-of-Best-Practices.pdf.

[40] Luigi Scazzieri , "Can the EU's Strategic Compass Steer European Defence?," Centr for European Reform , 2021, https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/bulletin_134_article3_LS.pdf.

[41] European Commission, 2021 State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen, 16 September, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_21_4701

4.1.7. Science

- To maintain military and political advantage in the current increasingly challenging geopolitical setting, the transatlantic community needs to keep and expand its technological edge over its competitors. In the military domain, as well as in the civil sector, emerging and disruptive technologies, especially in the context of a progressing digitalisation, are fundamentally shaping the posture of both NATO and the EU. **Investing in defence research and development (R&D) is, thus, a key discipline which must remain among the top strategic priorities of both organisations. to take the necessary legislative measures on an international level together.**

- At the forefront of NATO's R&D efforts stand the Science and Technology Organization (STO) that ensures technological and scientific collaboration between allies. The backbone aspect of the NATO's R&D is the strong transatlantic character of the cooperation. For many of the EU and NATO members, and especially the medium and smaller-sized countries such as the V4, the Alliance has been the favourable institution for R&D cooperation, because these countries benefit from the cooperation with US companies and can access technology and weapons they otherwise would not be capable of acquiring.[42] However, despite those advantages, NATO remains an intergovernmental organisation with no sanctioning mechanisms for states not delivering on agreed targets, and also, different threat perceptions across the Alliance further limit R&D cooperation in certain programmes (e.g. ballistic missile defence).

- As a part of a wider geopolitical 'awakening' of the EU, 2016 marked a turning point in the EU's defence research activities, with the establishment of the European Defence Fund (EDF) aimed at the strengthening of the interoperability of member-states' armies and reducing duplication. Currently, the fund with a budget of EUR 7.9 billion makes the EU the third largest European investor in defence.[43] The EU's, very much like NATO's, R&D activities have been plagued by different threat perceptions and perspectives on the EU's role in the defence domain.

- Despite being obvious partners sharing a majority of members with overlapping interests and values, the NATO and EU cooperation in the field of R&D has been a constrained enterprise.

- Since the 2016 EU-NATO Joint Declaration that stressed, among other things, the need for a greater partnership in R&D,[44] there has only been a little progress in finding synergies of both organisations. Today's cooperation is limited to staff-to-staff interactions and a few occasional high-level meetings. These exchanges have been concerned mainly with research in AI, autonomous systems, and big data.

- Most generally, the reasons for difficulties in an EU-NATO R&D partnership lay the nature, and consequently strategic directions and needs, of both organisations.

The Boeing X-32, left, and the Lockheed X-35 prototype airplanes that competed for the DoD contract to produce the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) in 1997. Lockheed won the competition with X-35 and would eventually produce the F-35 Lightning II. Author: U.S. Air Force, CC BY-SA 4.0

[42] Fiott, Daniel, EU-NATO Cooperation: The Case of Defence R&D, In The Emergence of EU Defence Research Policy, Springer, 2018, p.281-297.

[43] Zubașcu, Florin. EU set to launch €7.9B defence R&D programme after Council and Parliament agree budget. Science Business, 2020. https://sciencebusiness.net/news/eu-set-launch-eu79b-defence-rd-programme-after-council-and-parliament-agree-budget.

[44] "Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." 2016. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm.

- This lack of defined EU defence aims and tasks fundamentally blocks any enhanced cooperation with NATO both in R&D and generally. In other words, **the EU must make it clear what kind of defence actor it wants to be and what weapons it will need because, for instance, focusing solely on threats from Russia may require in some cases different R&D investments than crisis management operations in Africa**. While the Capability Development Plan and CARD clearly say what kind of capabilities EU Member States need, the Strategic Compass should help to answer these crucial questions.

4.1.8. Space domain

- Space is a very rapidly developing domain and currently faces unprecedented global competition in a changing geopolitical context. Space technology can optimise transport, improve crisis response in emergencies, secure banking transactions, help in the fight against climate change, increase security in relation to detecting illegal immigration or preventing cross-border organised crime. Using satellites, the EU as well as NATO, can respond to crises with greater speed, effectiveness and precision. These developments reflect the growing importance of space in our everyday lives and the functioning of modern societies, but also for defence and security.

- **Safety and the proper functioning of space and terrestrial infrastructure is of key interest to both the EU and NATO, especially in order to protect communications, navigation and commerce. Equally important is the need to ensure that there is no disruption to supplies of technology, components and materials, as well as ensuring the stable and free access to space and freedom to exploit space.** EU-NATO cooperation was intensified since the 2016 Warsaw Joint Declaration and reinforced by the 2018 Brussels Joint Declaration as strategic EU-NATO partnership. This cooperation is essential to address current security challenges.

- In the 2021 European Parliament (EP) resolution on EU-NATO, the EP underlined that space is a critical domain and that new technologies are rapidly enabling its use as one of the domains for defence. The EP underlined the need of enhanced cooperation in already existing EU programmes such as Galileo and Copernicus. Another area of potential further cooperation was identified to include the promotion of space safety standards and best practices. Other important interests of the EU were: the prevention of the weaponisation of space, safety of satellites in relation to the Space debris, cyber-attacks, and direct missile attack. The role of the EU Satellite Centre (EU SatCen) was highlighted.[45]

- NATO's recent engagement in space began when at the 2018 Brussels Summit Allied leaders acknowledged that space is a highly dynamic and rapidly evolving area and agreed to develop a NATO Space Policy, which was subsequently adopted in 2019. For NATO, space is essential to the Alliance's deterrence and defence and is invest¬ing over EUR 1 billion to procure sat¬ellite communications services for the period of 2020-2034. It is NATO's larg¬est ever investment in satellite communications to date.[46]

[45] P9_TA (2021) 0346: EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations. European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations (2020/2257(INI)), European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2021-0346_EN.html

[46] Lindstrom Gustav. "Stability and security in outer space: Reinforcing transatlantic cooperation." p. 154- 170. In: Soare R. Simona, 2020, Turning the tide. How to rescue transatlantic relations. European Union Institute for Security Studies. https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Transatlantic%20relations%20book.pdf

- During the NATO Summit in 2021 it has been acknowledged that rapid advances in space are affecting the security of NATO and its Allies, stating firstly that attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, and could potentially lead to the invocation of Article 5.[47] Secondly, the importance of space for NATO's deterrence and defence was highlighted and so was the need to secure access to space services, products, and capabilities. Lastly, it was declared that NATO's space awareness will be strengthened even further, with training and exercises, resilience, and innovation efforts already in place.[48] In the Secretary General's report – NATO 2030 – a transatlantic agenda for the future was proposed. Article 8 of the document highlighted the "Strengthened Resilience Commitment" that proposed for Member States to "step up efforts to secure and diversify their supply chains, as well as ensure the resilience of their critical infrastructure (on land, at sea, in space and in cyberspace) and key industries, including by protecting them from harmful economic activities".[49] Lastly, NATO also announced plans to develop a Strategic Space Situational Awareness System (3SAS) at NATO Headquarters.

- On the EU side, the space policy aims at leveraging the space sector for the promotion of social and economic benefits to citizens, fighting climate change and promoting technological innovation. Information from space is also used in case of disasters, such as, earthquakes, forest fires or floods. Space helps with situational awareness, decision-making and connectivity of technologies and systems. The Space Policy includes the EU Space Programme, EU Space Research and Innovation initiatives and investing in quantum technologies.

- The need for autonomy and security of EU space-based services was underlined in the EU Global Strategy (EUGS). The necessity to ensure stable and autonomous access to space was highlighted in the Council Conclusions in 2016. In response, capability projects were designed under the Permanent Structured Cooperation, the grants under Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP). Outer Space has been identified as a key priority under the EU Capability Development Plan (CDP) and it has called upon a common European approach in CARD Focus Area "Defence in space".

- Part of the core of the EU's security and defence is ensuring secure flows and uses of data and signals, as well as communication, and reducing the possibilities of jamming and eavesdropping of data signals. Therefore, the EU plans to invest in quantum technologies as well as build a full Quantum Information Network (QIN) by 2034 under the 2028-2034 MFF. Protecting critical infrastructure and supply chains is in line with the EU resilience and autonomy efforts.[50]

Image of the International Space Station taken by ESA astronaut Luca Parmitano, during the first spacewalk to service the cosmic ray detecting Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS-02). Author: European Space Agency, CC BY-SA 3.0 IGO

[47] Brussels Summit Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Article 33. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 14 June 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm

[48] Brussels Summit Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 14 June 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm

[49] Strengthened Resilience Commitment: Brussels summit on 14 June 2021. Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021. the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_185340.htm

[50] The European space sector as an enabler of EU strategic autonomy (December 2020). Policy Department for External Relations Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, PE 653.620. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/653620/EXPO_IDA(2020)653620_EN.pdf

4.1.9. Climate

- The securitisation of climate change is on the international agenda, creating concerns about the appropriateness of security responses. Tackling climate change is one of the most obvious areas where action at a supranational level is the most efficient and effective. Both the EU and NATO have identified climate change as an international issue. The great scale of the climate emergency, and measures needed to become carbon-neutral by 2050, have a greater chance of succeeding with intergovernmental organisations, such as the EU and NATO, in mitigation. Not to mention that risk management policies can be shared and adopted across a wide range of countries more quickly and efficiently. Growing concern of climate-induced migration and the cost accompanying climate change damage is estimated to cost the EU economy over EUR 65 billion a year by 2100.[51] Climate change does not know borders and is therefore one of the defining challenges of our times, for both the EU and NATO.

- While other international organisations are better equipped to lead the fight against climate change, NATO can play an important role with the EU by its side. It is without a doubt that climate change impacts all allies and the state of its security. The 2010 Strategic Concept states that climate change is a driver of NATO's security environment.[52] It has become increasingly clear that climate change has consequences that reach the very top of the security agenda. This includes flooding, disease and famine, resulting in mass migration in areas already prone to conflict. This will only be intensified by drought and crop-failure, leading to intensified competition for food, water and energy. It is here that NATO can play a vital role by providing security for the EU Member States in such times where the EU is not prepared itself. On 14 July 2021, the European Commission adopted a series of legislative proposals setting out how it intends to achieve climate neutrality in the EU by 2050, including the intermediate target of at least a 55% net reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030.[53] Both the EU and NATO aspire to support implementation of the Paris Agreement, and NATO Allies have recognised the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate change.

- On 23-24 March 2021, NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed NATO's Climate Change and Security Agenda, which provides "a 360-degree approach and encompasses measures to increase both NATO's and its Allies' awareness of the impact of climate change on security, along with developing clear adaptation and mitigation measures, and enhanced outreach, while ensuring a credible deterrence and defence posture, and upholding the priorities of the safety of military personnel and operational and cost effectiveness".[54]

Lake Oroville on the morning of Memorial Day 2021. In May 2021, water levels of Lake Oroville dropped to 38% of capacity. The boats are dwarfed by the exposed banks while California is headed into another drought year. Authors: Frank Schulenburg, CC BY-SA 4.0

[51] Bruno CATTANEO, "Global Warming Could More than Double Costs Caused by Drought in EUROPE, Study Finds," EU Science Hub - European Commission, 10 May, 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/news/global-warming-could-more-double-costs-caused-drought-europe-study-finds.

[52] NATO Nato, "Secretary General: NATO Must Help to Curb Climate Change," NATO, 28 September, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_178372.htm.

[53] Thierry CABUZEL, "EU Climate Action and the European Green Deal," Climate Action - European Commission, October 23, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eu-climate-action_en.

[54] NATO, "NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan," NATO, 14 June, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_185174.htm.

- To be effective, however, **the EU needs to find a common voice on the security implications of climate change and recognise that due to the very nature of EU governance and decision-making, Member States do not have to address the exigencies of climate change by themselves but instead can count on each other as a union.** The recently updated defence policy underlines the importance of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO and is fundamental to addressing the security challenges facing the EU and its neighbourhood with climate change.[55]

- **Allies should invest in green technologies for the ultimate purpose of improving military effectiveness and maintaining competitive advantages among rivals.** In 2014, NATO was thinking ahead and adopted the Green Defence framework, which aspires to reduce the environmental footprint of its military operations and improve NATO's resilience by investing in green technologies that reduce fuel consumption, energy dependencies, mission footprints and long, vulnerable supply lines.[56] The EU and NATO have also agreed to initiate a regular high-level climate and security dialogue to exchange views and coordinate further actions.[57] To this end, strategic planning is needed to build climate change resilience and civil preparedness. Not to mention, the resilience of military installations and critical infrastructure that will be needed as climate change will create more conditions to conduct military operations. To this end, EU Member States should be inspired to follow suit and take NATO as a prime example of how radical change is necessary and can be done effectively with proper governance.

- **NATO and the EU can work together on increasing their situational awareness, early warning signs, and information sharing on climate and security and can utilise NATO's Centre of Excellence on Climate and Security as a common platform. With more investments into renewable technologies and smart telecommunication grids that are able to withstand weather events and cyberattacks, all the allies would gain by becoming more effective and resilient.** Moreover, NATO should reinvigorate, reassess, and revise its 2014 Green Defence framework considering evolving challenges and emerging green technologies, and work with the EU on the Green Deal to encompass more of a military-security paradigm. To this end, all allies would retain their confidence and strength as a union and organisation by tackling climate change together.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev during a ceremony marking the start of construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline's underwater section. Author: The Presidential Press and Information Office, CC BY-SA 4.0

[55] "Texts Adopted - Annual Report on the Implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy - Wednesday, 15 January 2020," europarl.europa.eu, January 15, 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0009_EN.html.

[56] "NATO 2030: United for a New Era," NATO (NATO, November 25, 2020), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.

[57] NATO, "Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021," NATO, June 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.

4.1.10. Energy security

- Energy security plays an important role in the stability and common security of NATO allies and EU Member States. The disruption of energy supplies could affect security within the territories of NATO members and partner countries and could have a direct impact on NATO's military operations.[58]

- Since Russia cut off gas flowing through Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, energy security has been on the agenda of NATO's Member States. As recently as 21 July 2021, the U.S. issued a special briefing on the security implications and risks of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in Germany on European energy security and on Ukraine and frontline NATO and EU countries.[59] The main concern for the EU and NATO at this time is Russia's use of energy as a geopolitical weapon and the vulnerability of countries like Ukraine, which are dependent on Russian gas and transit fees, to Russian maleficent activities.[60]

- NATO also relies on a stable and reliable energy supply, suppliers and energy resources, including the integration of sustainable energy sources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, which are all critical importance to increase resilience against external political and economic pressure.[61] It is important to ensure that the members of the Alliance, particularly the EU, are not vulnerable to political or coercive manipulation of energy tactics. **EU Member States should continue to seek further diversification of their energy supplies, and to reduce the reliance on external energy sources**. For NATO, this is important because energy developments can have significant political and security implications and affect all partners. NATO should increase their capacity to support national authorities in protecting critical infrastructure relating to energy networks, including against malicious hybrid and cyber activity.[62]

- **The Strategic Compass has an opportunity to distinguish how EU instruments and mechanisms can be utilised for mutual assistance and solidarity with NATO.[63] Any strategy to enhance the Union's resilience in security and defence requires an emphasis on civil and societal preparedness and especially when it comes to energy security.**

- For the EU's military level of ambition, the reality of available capabilities must be factored in, and serious shortfalls remain in the energy sector whereas Member States are not equipped to handle a threat on vulnerable infrastructure. Not to mention, alternative sources of energy are limited to meet the high demands of the growing economies. Crisis management is needed given the Union's trading power, and the EU, together with NATO, needs to focus on the physical protection of the global commons, especially energy pipelines.[64]

- While drafting the Strategic Compass, the EU must define more precisely its military level of ambition and what it implies for capability development and partnerships. In short, **the Strategic Compass should contribute, alongside NATO, in raising the civilian awareness of the multidimensional character of today's security threats, particularly EU's energy dependencies or foreign direct investment in critical European infrastructure.**

[58] Nato, "Energy Security," NATO, September 10, 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49208.htm.

[59] "Briefing with Senior State Department Officials on European Energy Security - United States Department of State," U.S. Department of State, 21 July, 2021, https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-senior-state-department-officials-on-european-energy-security/.

[60] Ibid.

[61] "Smart Energy: NATO Documents," NATO LibGuides, 12 July, 2018. https://natolibguides.info/smartenergy/documents.

[62] Nato, "Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021," NATO, June 14, 2021.

[63] "Towards a Strategic Compass: Where Is the EU Heading on Security and Defence?," The European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), December 18, 2020, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Event%20Report%20-%20EUISS%20Strategic%20Compass.pdf.

[64] Ibid.

4.1.11. Emerging and disruptive technologies

- Emerging disruptive technologies (EDTs) range from artificial intelligence (AI), big data, autonomous systems, hypersonic weapons and robotics, among others. EDTs have become a reoccurring topic in both the EU and NATO context, as debates around how to enhance the Member State's ability to counter and prevent these threats continue to dominate the security and defence field.

- At a recent meeting hosted by the European Defence Agency and the Portuguese Ministry of Defence (Presidency in the Council of the EU), senior representatives discussed the need to "stimulate synergies between NATO, the European Commission and EDA, taking advantage of civil-military cooperation and the dual-use nature of technological development".[65] Specifically, the need to innovate and change the way the organisations operate and think in this sphere has been discussed. The growing strategic importance of "cross-fertilization between civil-military industries" was behind the European Commission Action Plan to increase the synergies between civil, defence and space industries. As highlighted in the previous sections, the EU and NATO have taken strides in developing these areas and there remains an untapped potential for more integration and collaboration.

- However, in addition to the EU and NATO aligning further on these emerging challenges, regulation and policy tend to lag behind the rate of technological advancement and is an area that the EU should continue to develop as mentioned in the cybersecurity section.

- Established at the London NATO meeting in 2019, NATO Leaders agreed for an Emerging and Disruptive Technology Implementation Roadmap. The purpose was to help "structure NATO's work across key technology areas, and enable Allies to consider these technologies' implications for deterrence and defence, and capability development".[66] In 2021, NATO Defence Ministers endorsed "Foster and Protect: NATO's Coherent Implementation Strategy on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies" which focuses on fostering the development of dual-use technologies will strengthen the Alliance's edge, while also creating a forum for Allies to exchange best practices that help protect against threats.

- As the Strategic Compass develops, the dual-use potential of space, cyber and emerging & disruptive technologies will continue to be driven by the civilian and commercial demand and supply. On the military side, there should be ample use of "existing EU dual-use capabilities (Galileo, Copernicus, etc.) as well as connecting to civilian-driven dual-use research and technology/development. The Technology Roadmap of the European Commission, to be ready by October 2021, is an important tool for prioritising the selection of investment under EU programmes".[67]

- **Coordination between the EU and NATO is not only important to avoid a duplication at both the civil and military usage of these technologies, but also to coordinate investment, channel resources and to make optimum use by the military of dual-use capability development**. It has been recommended that together, the EU and NATO should "constitute a technology and innovation partnership to combine efforts in an area that is likely to be decisive in the next decades for the security and defence of all the Member States.[68] The Strategic Compass along with the future NATO Strategic Concept remains a solid start to counter and mitigate threats from EDTs.

[65] European Defence Agency, High-level conference discussed impact of emerging disruptive technologies on defence, 20 April 2020. https://eda.europa.eu/news-and-events/news/2021/04/20/high-level-conference-discussed-impact-of-emerging-disruptive-technologies-on-defence

[66] Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, last updated 18, June 2021. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_184303.htm?

[67] Zandee, Dick, Adája Stoetman and Bob Deen, The EU's Strategic Compass for security and defence Squaring ambition with reality, Clingendael Report, May 2021, p 5.

[68] Ibid.

The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal ("dagger") is a Russian hypersonic, nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). Seen here carried by MIG-31K interceptor fighter during the 2018 Moscow Victory Day Parade. Author: kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0

4.2. Conclusion

- Experts contributing to this piece have outlined the many challenges that the EU and NATO face, when it comes to developing and integrating their relative security and defence portfolios. However, what was emphasised most was the simple acknowledgement that both organisations, created for very different purposes – have the same goal in mind – to ensure and guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. The EU and NATO have come a long way to establish cooperation in order to further this goal.

- The Strategic Compass aims to create a coherent and strategic approach to the existing defence initiatives and to bolster the EU's security and defence policy, considering the threats and challenges that the EU is facing – not just for today but in the future. While this is in line with NATO's goals as well, Europe should not abandon or slow down their investment and further interoperability in their security and defence capabilities, especially through initiatives such as PESCO and EDF, on a condition that duplication of effort with NATO is avoided.

- Experts discussed how in the short-term, ramifications of the pandemic and the diverging perspectives on the future of the EU and NATO may generate a temptation to decrease defence integration and funding for EU and NATO capabilities. In the long term, large-scale questions about how and where Europe sees themselves as a democratic leader and defender of the rule of law will also need to be addressed. To counter these short- and long-term challenges as outlined in this chapter, the EU and its Member States need "a change of mindset to safeguard both their capacity to act autonomously on defence and the democratic quality of the integration process in this area". If not, the Strategic Compass will remain just that, a compass to point the EU and its Member States into the direction it wants to take Europe but without concrete steps in order to turn words into action.[69]

[69] Csernatoni, Raluca, EU Security and Defence Challenges: Toward a European Defence Winter?, Carnegie Europe, 11 June, 2020. https://carnegieeurope.eu/2020/06/11/eu-security-and-defence-challenges-toward-european-defence-winter-pub-82032

Executive Summary

Main threats and challenges for NATO – common V4 perspective

- All the V4 members agree that the Russian threat is real and that destabilisation has to be countered and deterred by all means. In addition, Ukraine is a vital security partner: all V4 states support stabilisation and cooperation efforts with Kiev. Similarly, the V4 is united in seeing Western Balkan stability as a key priority. There are, however, differences in willingness to take responsibility for these processes. While Poland champions the Eastern strategic direction, Hungary fosters a more focused approach to the South.

- Alongside the geographically defined threats, three distinct challenges emerged in the discussion. China is mostly an indirect issue, in light of US-China competition, where V4 states serve only an auxiliary role. They aim to uphold alliance cohesion while preserving Chinese investments and trade opportunities, and also pushing back against real security threats, primarily in cyberspace. China, therefore, presents a balancing task for the V4 countries in the NATO framework. Cyberspace itself is a "low-hanging fruit" for cooperation and an important one at that. This is, and will be, a chief area where the V4 countries can push forward their joint action. **For the V4 states, however, the key issue is alliance cohesion. Beyond all the issues presented above, their main objective is to maintain the NATO security umbrella and its core tasks of defending Europe and the US from aggression. None of the V4 states wants a situation in which NATO guarantees would diminish. Every discussion and every political manoeuvre must abide by this iron rule.**

- The experts also noted that the V4 is a suitable venue for preparatory work on the NATO security stance, but, in the end, NATO's future will be decided at NATO forums and not by regional alliances. Where the V4 comes into play is in discussing each country's approaches and finding areas of joint action – either within the political-diplomatic or the security-military dimensions – where V4 interests and capabilities lead to actionable initiatives. These can channel joint messages into the alliance framework or into larger-scale initiatives, such as the V4 Battle Group, the KFOR leadership position, or even other out-of-area missions. The V4 has its disagreements connected to security, but these must not be an obstacle to real and useful cooperation benefitting not only the Central European region but also the NATO alliance as a whole.

Core Tasks and Principles in NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept

- NATO remains the strongest and most successful alliance in history. NATO's fundamental and enduring purpose has not changed since the 2010 Strategic Concept. This should be clearly underlined in the 2022 Strategic Concept: NATO's ultimate goal is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. The basic ingredients for this mission remain in force: military strength, political solidarity, unity and cohesion, combined with pursuit of a long-term stable international environment.

- The 2022 Strategic Concept should be clear about the centrality of transatlantic relations, and the firmness of the political and military bonds between Europe and North America. For all its member states NATO should be a point of reference for any discussion that touches upon the Euro-Atlantic security. In fact, no other international organisation, including the European Union, can replace NATO with its core mission of collective defence.

- Three core tasks remain a vital pillar that helps to maintain political solidarity, unity and cohesion between Allies. Yet, the 2022 Strategic Concept should restore collective defence as the task that could be best describe as primus inter pares. Collective defence is the only core tasks that is derived directly from the Washington Treaty.

- The 2022 Strategic Concept should confirm that NATO provides the framework within which Allies can work and train together in order to plan and conduct multinational crisis management operations. Yet, the 2022 Strategic Concept should set a realistic level of ambition, based on the lessons learned from NATO's operational engagement in Afghanistan. Therefore, the potential way ahead for NATO should be based on the assumption that prevention is better than intervention.

- The 2010 Strategic Concept added cooperative security as a core task. This approach reflected the unfounded optimism about cooperative Russia, represented also by the misguided efforts to reset relations with Moscow after the 2008 Russian-Georgian war. Based on the current and foreseeable strategic environment, the 2022 Strategic Concept will have to adapt the character and content of this core task, including its name which does not reflect the strategic reality. In fact, cooperative security today should be translated into ways and means of establishing partnerships for shared security which could also become the new name of the core task.

Strategic Adaptation to New Challenges

- **Decision-making**. The consensus-based process should remain intact. At the moment, it is not the consensus rule that is the problem in most cases, but the implementation of agreed policies. A similar recommendation also came from the Reflection Group, who argued that NATO should not change how decisions are made, but should focus on efforts to "ensure that consensus-based decisions are implemented."

- **Resilience**. NATO must focus more on improving resilience. Even though increasing resilience is a collective commitment, it should remain a national responsibility. For this reason, even if one wants to propose ambitious goals in this respect, it may be wise to think in terms of voluntary rather than obligatory targets. This might also offer an avenue for linking potential elements of NATO's policy towards Russia and China.

- **Russia**. The passages on Russia in the 2010 Strategic Concept are now outdated. The new Strategic Concept may make a difference by generating a consensus for finally defining Russia as a country behaving as an adversary. This is indispensable for a number of reasons, not least connected to specific policies such as military posture, hybrid threats, or political solidarity. That does not mean closing doors to possible dialogue, but it would confirm the reality ensuing from Moscow's actions.

- **China**. A new chapter on China has to be introduced, as its growing role and clout are often labeled as among the most important challenges faced by the international order. NATO should focus on determining effective means of restricting the negative impact of this transformation, while not ruling out potential opportunities for engagement. The Strategic Concept could be used to communicate to Beijing that for the time being, NATO is not labeling China as an adversary, but reserving its judgment pending further developments.

- **Military spending**. The 2% commitment made by member states should remain. If it were taken out, this would be read as an admission that NATO has compromised its credibility, inevitably with negative consequences. It is the precondition of further adaptation and of remedying some persistent capability shortfalls.

Strategic Compass and the EU-NATO relations in the field of security

- Experts contributing to this piece have outlined the many challenges that the EU and NATO face, when it comes to developing and integrating their relative security and defence portfolios. However, what was emphasised most was the simple acknowledgement that both organisations, created for very different purposes – have the same goal in mind – to ensure and guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means. The EU and NATO have come a long way to establish cooperation in order to further this goal.

- The Strategic Compass aims to create a coherent and strategic approach to the existing defence initiatives and to bolster the EU's security and defence policy, considering the threats and challenges that the EU is facing – not just for today but in the future. While this is in line with NATO's goals as well, Europe should not abandon or slow down their investment and further interoperability in their security and defence capabilities, especially through initiatives such as PESCO and EDF, on a condition that duplication of effort with NATO is avoided.

- Experts discussed how in the short-term, ramifications of the pandemic and the diverging perspectives on the future of the EU and NATO may generate a temptation to decrease defence integration and funding for EU and NATO capabilities. In the long term, large-scale questions about how and where Europe sees themselves as a democratic leader and defender of the rule of law will also need to be addressed. To counter these short- and long-term challenges as outlined in this chapter, the EU and its Member States need "a change of mindset to safeguard both their capacity to act autonomously on defence and the democratic quality of the integration process in this area". If not, the Strategic Compass will remain just that, a compass to point the EU and its Member States into the direction it wants to take Europe but without concrete steps in order to turn words into action.

Appendix

Visegrad Declaration 1991

Declaration on Cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Hungary in Striving for European Integration

The meeting, in Bratislava, of presidents, prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs and members of parliaments of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Hungary began a process of creating foundations and new forms of political, economic and cultural cooperation of these countries in the altered situation in the Central Europe.

The similarity of the situation that has evolved over the past decades has determined for these three countries convergent basic objectives:

- *full restitution of state independence, democracy and freedom,*
- *elimination of all existing social, economic and spiritual aspects of the totalitarian system,*
- *construction of a parliamentary democracy, a modern State of Law, respect for human rights and freedoms,*
- *creation of a modern free market economy,*
- *full involvement in the European political and economic system, as well as the system of security and legislation.*

The identity of objectives, as well as similarity of ways of achieving them in many fields poses identical tasks before the three neighboring countries.

Coordination of the efforts—with respect for national peculiarities—increases the chances of attaining the desired goals and brings closer the realization of their objectives.

A favorable basis for intensive development of cooperation is ensured by the similar character of the significant changes occurring in these countries, their traditional, historically shaped system of mutual contacts, cultural and spiritual heritage and common roots of religious traditions. The diverse and rich cultures of these nations also embody the fundamental values of the achievements of European thought. The mutual spiritual, cultural and economic influences exerted over a long period of time, resulting from the fact of proximity, could support cooperation based on natural historical development.

The cooperation of nations and civil communities of the three countries is essential for joint creation of conditions that will contribute in each of the countries to the development of a democratic social system based on respect for the fundamental human rights and freedoms, liberty of economic undertakings, rule of law, tolerance, spiritual and cultural traditions and respect for moral values.

Simultaneously, the signatories of the Declaration respect the right of all other nations to express their own identity. They emphasize that national, ethnic, religious and language minorities, in accordance with traditional European values and in harmony with internationally recognized documents on human rights, must be able to enjoy all rights in political, social, economic and cultural life, not excluding education.

In unified Europe, to which the three countries wish to actively contribute, it is possible to maintain culture and national character while fully realizing the universal system of human values. A systematic fulfillment of the idea of civil society is the key question to the spiritual and material development of Central European region and an indispensable condition for establishing of a mutually beneficial cooperation with developed countries and European institutions.

Drawing on universal human values as the most important element of the European heritage and own national identities should serve as the basis for developing a society of people cooperating with each other in a harmonious way, tolerant to each other, to individual families, local, regional and national communities, free of hatred, nationalism, xenophobia, and local strife.

It is the conviction of the states-signatories that in the light of the political, economic and social challenges ahead of them, and their efforts for renewal based on principles of democracy, their cooperation is a significant step on the way to general European integration.

The signatories of the Declaration shall jointly undertake the following practical steps:

- *in accordance with the interests of the particular countries they shall harmonize their activities to shape cooperation and close contacts with European institutions and shall hold regular consultations on the matters of their security,*
- *they shall endeavor to create free contacts between citizens, institutions, churches and social organizations,*
- *in order to support free flow of labor force and capital, they shall develop economic cooperation, based on the principles of the free market, and mutually beneficial trade in goods and services, moreover they shall strive to create favorable conditions for direct cooperation of enterprises and foreign capital investments, aimed at improving economic effectiveness,*
- *they shall focus on the development of the infrastructure in communications, with regard both to links between the three countries and those with other parts of Europe, mainly in the north-south direction, and shall coordinate the development of their power systems and telecommunication networks,*
- *they shall increase cooperation in the field of ecology,*
- *they shall create favorable conditions for free flow of information, press and cultural values,*
- *they shall jointly develop multilateral cooperation to ensure optimum conditions for full realization of the rights of national minorities living on the territories of their countries,*
- *they shall support mutually beneficial cooperation of interested local self-governments of their countries and establishment of sub-regional contacts.*

The signatories of the Declaration state that their cooperation in no way will interfere with or restrict their relations with other countries, and that it will not be directed against the interests of any other party.

The cooperation of the signatories will be realized through meetings and consultations held at various levels and in various forms.

Done in Visegrád on February 15th, 1991 in three identical originals in the Polish, Czech and Hungarian languages, equally valid.

The North Atlantic Treaty
Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.
They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- *on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France 2, on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;*

- *on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.*

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications. (3)

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

1. *The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951.*

2. *On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.*

3. *The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposition of the ratifications of all signatory states.*

The Casimir Pulaski Foundation has a partnership status with the Council of Europe

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