

POLICY PAPER

What Role for the Czech Republic in EU Military Missions?

Ondřej Ditrych

- This paper seeks to capture how recent strategic trends and Russia's assertive revisionism in the Eastern approaches – a manifestation of a more general transition of the international system to a less multilateral and more *multipolar* one, combined with uncertainty about the future role of the U.S. in European security in particular play out in the case of the Czech Republic's future role in EU military operations in the near- to medium term.
- Following a survey of where Prague currently stands on CSDP, key structural determinants and variables of possible future participation in EU military operations are identified. The key recommendations drawn from this analysis are that to be serious about more defence integration and participation in CSDP, the Czech Republic must meet declarations by deeds, which should include defining scenarios of possible future engagement; revamping of the acquisition and recruitment process; and engaging in more international cooperation to develop practical capacities that it can contribute toward meeting EU's new level of ambition.



The Czech Republic and the CSDP: Overview

A Member State since 2004, the Czech Republic has had an uneven record of participation in EU military operations to date. First, the focus was on the Balkans as a region of special interest. In addition to a contingent in NATO KFOR, the Czech Republic deployed a smaller expeditionary corps of 400 troops (total) to EUFOR ALTHEA (Bosnia) in 2004-2008. The numbers were later decreased, however, and the participation in military operations abroad was narrowed down almost entirely to NATO ISAF (Afghanistan). The participation in ALTHEA was discontinued altogether in 2008 and renewed in 2010; however, it has since been limited to dispatching mere two officers to HQ in Sarajevo. Save for two persons sent to EUFOR Chad and three in the HQ of EUNAVFOR Somalia (ATALANTA), the Czech Republic all but pulled out of CSDP military operations.¹

The tide turned in 2013, when the government took the decision to deploy to EUTM Mali. The first contingent of ca. 30 troops was assembled from the corps of the 4th rapid deployment brigade and the 7th mechanised brigade and tasked with protection of the mission HQ in Bamako and training of Malian armed forces in Koulikoro. The successive contingents have maintained the mission, with the 9th contingent moreover involved in a strike against militants who had attacked a hotel resort in Kagaba, in the vicinity of Bamako (Jun. 2017). The expeditionary mandate passed by the Czech Parliament for 2015-2016 envisioned the deployment of up to 290 troops in MENA, Sahel and the Middle East (of which 150 dedicated troops remained unassigned to a particular country or operation to effectively respond to the 'fast pace of change' in the region) – compared to 310 troop ceiling established for NATO Resolute Support (Afghanistan) and 20 for the Balkan

missions.² In addition to participation in EUTM, a unit of 601th special operations group was deployed to U.N. operation MINUSMA in Mali in this period, complementing Czech participation in the air advisory team in Iraq related to the delivery of L-159 ALCAs to Iraqi air force, MFO Sinai, and UNDOF. In 2016, another mandate was passed for 2017-2018 that confirmed the new direction insofar as the participation in NATO Resolute Support is decreasing to 250 troops (2018) while the presence in Mali is reinforced and other CSDP contributions are continued.³ Currently, the Czech Republic's participation in CSDP operations comprises ALTHEA (2 troops), EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA (3 troops, HQ in Rome or aboard of the mission's flagship), NAVFOR ATALANTA (3 troops, HQ in Northwood, including one planning officer in the the mission's intelligence unit) and EUTM Mali (with the mandate ceiling of 50 troops).

The changing balance in expeditionary engagements has no immediate bearing on Czech commitments to NATO's collective defence. Indeed, the amount of troops set aside for NATO Response Force has been decreasing recently: from 1,500 troops in 2015 (including 150 troops assigned to the VJTF) to 810 troops in 2016 to 380 troops in 2017. That said, the Czech Republic has maintained contributions to NATO exercises and rotational presence in the Baltic countries, and in 2018 the deployment of up to 290 troops under special mandate is planned in Lithuania and Latvia as a part of NATO's enhanced forward presence (eFP) while another battalion-size commitment is foreseen to the VJTF under Polish command in 2020.

The decline in NRF contributions is however closely related to another recent shift: interest in participation and effectiveness of the EU battle groups (EUBGs). The Czech Republic participated in two EUBGs in 2016, one formed with V4 partners (825 assigned troops) – to be again on stand-by in the second half of 2019 – and another one with Germany as a leading nation (244 assigned troops).

¹ In contrast, it continued to participate more substantially in civilian missions, most notably in EULEX Kosovo and EUMM Georgia.

² *The Proposal by the Government of the Czech Republic for Participation of Forces of the Ministry of Defence in Foreign*

Operations (2015-2016), retrieved from: <http://www.psp.cz/sqw/text/orig2.sqw?idd=111622&pdf=1>.

³ *The Proposal by the Government of the Czech Republic for Participation of Forces of the Ministry of Defence in Foreign Operations (2017-2018)*, retrieved from: <http://www.psp.cz/sqw/text/orig2.sqw?idd=126182>.

Moreover, it has been vocal on the EUBGs in the EU's current debate about defence, having made the case in favour of more standardisation reflecting the most likely deployment scenarios; increasing the common element of their certification; engagement in live exercises (connected to NATO); and more common financing through Athena – regularised for deployment *and* redeployment, and also including partial financing of live exercises. (The principle of common financing of EUBGs on a permanent basis through Athena, which had been opposed by the United Kingdom, was endorsed by the last European Council on defence in June 2017.)⁴ In line with the general preference of key actors in the Czech defence establishment that the development of EU capabilities should be framed as boosting 'European pillar' that could serve also for NATO, it has advocated for a clearer linkage between EUBGs and NATO framework nation concept (FNC).

Structural Constraints and Key Variables

The turn should not be overestimated, but it is real: a shift in terms of changing balance of Czech engagement in favour of the CSDP and following the 'Southern vector' (MENA and Sahel). It has moreover been compounded by the Czech government's support for deeper defence integration in the current debate and in broader terms stronger and autonomous EU. How the ambition to engage more in military operations as part of the broader effort to play a meaningful role in EU's common defence and crisis management plays out will be limited in all possible scenarios by two predetermined structural constraints: *baseline capacities*, and *short term expense allocations and inefficiency*.

The *Longterm Defence Outlook: 2030* sets as a basic requirement the ability of the armed forces to engage in the full spectrum of several simultaneous operations (with

allies) at the complete scale of intensity.⁵ That, however, remains a distant prospect indeed, as is the ambition to field a brigade in CSDP or other non-art. 5 military operations. Presently, Czech land forces comprise two *incomplete* brigades altogether in addition to auxiliary forces, and suffer from fragmentation that makes deployments abroad difficult. In 2014, a team of experts from Czech Defence University concluded that the Czech Republic is 'capable of deployment of a battalion-size contingent to a foreign operations, but its rotation and maintenance then falls on the back of virtually the entire army.'⁶ That not much has changed since then is illustrated by the composition of the 9th task force of the Czech armed forces serving in EUTM Mali (just redeployed from the mission): the core was formed by members of the 71th mechanised battalion from Hranice, but it comprised also troops of the 41th mechanised battalion from Žatec and 44th light mechanised battalion based in Jindřichův Hradec – two units from another brigade –, and of 102nd reconnaissance battalion from Prostějov in addition to a few other units.

This baseline capacity is the result of years of limited and unfocused defence spending governed by the principle of 'deferred need' and further reduced as a response to the economic stagnation. Indeed, the spending trend has been reversed as a result of the Ukraine crisis and the renewed NATO Member States' defence pledge of annual 2% GDP (and 20% investment expenses) reiterated during the Wales summit. A day before it started, the government parties issued a statement promising to raise defence spending to 1.4% GDP by 2020, perceiving such increase as 'realistic from the perspective of the country's economic potential and the needs of [Czech] armed forces.'⁷ The pledge, effected by a combination of outside and inside pressure by security professionals advocating for the interest of their *champ* who seized their opportunity after Crimea, remains in place. It is now complemented only by a vague commitment to reach 2% GDP in 2024 to placate the Trump administration pressing for a more balanced

⁴ *European Council Conclusions on Security and Defence*, Press Release 403/17 (22 Jun. 2017).

⁵ *Longterm Defence Outlook: 2030*, op.cit.

⁶ František Mičánek et al., *Zpráva o zabezpečení obrany ČR v roce 2014 (Mýty a reality)*, *Vojenské rozhledy*, No. 2 (2014),

retrieved from: <http://www.vojenskerozhledy.cz/kategorie/zprava-o-stavu-zabezpeceni-obrany-cr-v-roce-2014-myty-a-realita>.

⁷ Press Release, Government of the Czech Republic, 3 Sept. 2014.

burden sharing in NATO. In reality, however, while in absolute numbers the defence budget has indeed grown, due to the parallel (and faster) economic growth the spending fell to 0.97% of GDP and 10.52% in investment in 2016 (with the estimated 1.1% GDP due to + 200 million EUR expected increase in 2017) and with the current trends not witnessing a major change, the foreseen defence budget in 2020 (2.56 billion EUR) would more likely amount to ca. 1.15% GDP. Explaining for the discrepancy of the pledge with the projected ratio of defence expenditures by economic growth – currently at + 4.5%, third highest in the EU – however does not stand a closer scrutiny. If more tax is collected and as a result, more resources are available in sum, why could there be no absolute increase in the defence budget?

Despite the widely shared assessment that the external security environment has deteriorated, there is thus limited political commitment on substantial increase in allocated resources. Needless to say, allocation is only a means of capacity building, not an end in itself. Equally important is spending *efficiency*. Yet, even here, major constraints on a more significant increase in capacity exist in the form of unspecified strategic vision (*what kind of armed forces should be developed*) – well illustrated by the broadly defined ambition in the *Defence Outlook: 2030* – and the slow pace of acquisitions resulting from ossified procedures and risk aversity following corruption charges related to several major tenders in the past. The modernisation and transformation of the armed forces is indeed moving forward after a long period of stagnation. However, to what extent this transformation may impact the real capacity to engage in future EU military operations is far from certain as there is no clear idea about their prioritised future role(s) – even as it should be noted that their current rate of deployability (39%) has been relatively high according to EDA's measures.⁸

⁸ European Defence Agency, *National Defence Data 2013-2014 and 2015 (est.) of the 27 EDA Member States*, Brussels (Jun. 2016), retrieved from: [https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/eda-national-defence-data-2013-2014-\(2015-est\)5397973fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f.pdf](https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/documents/eda-national-defence-data-2013-2014-(2015-est)5397973fa4d264cfa776ff000087ef0f.pdf).

⁹ Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

The effects of those structural constraints cannot be eliminated, but can be mitigated e.g. through a design and implementation of a more effective acquisition process. At the same time, political ambition is subject to change, as are external circumstances as another key variable.

Political Ambition. The shift is premised on maintaining the political guidance toward deeper defence integration – in part *en lieu* of moving toward the EU core in other areas (Eurozone). In the short term, the outcome of the general election that took place in October has a potential to become a juncture. What is at stake is less whether the Czech Republic will maintain the identity of an advocate of deeper defence integration but rather whether this position will be compounded by real commitments. The defence administration declares to be ready for higher costs associated with more participation in operations and integration with other Member States' armed forces. Perhaps the new government will attempt to get an easy pass and muddle through the commitments while seeking to benefit – though in a limited way – from the incentives such as those offered by the European Defence Fund (EDF). But even such lukewarm approach would be significant as it would lock the government in a rhetorical trap – the very same mechanism that may have enabled Czech Republic's membership in NATO and the EU when the brakemen could not legitimately resist CEE states' desire to 'return to Europe'⁹ – and produce potential path dependencies. The membership in PESCO now serves as a rather inexpensive identity marker; in the near future, however, PESCO may have disciplining effects as a source of outside pressures for action and norm compliance. A similar discipline of sorts may be enacted also by the recently agreed voluntary Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD).¹⁰ All this could feed changes in the strategic culture that would be conducive to a more active sustained position in EU's common defence, including participation in CSDP military

¹⁰ On scorecards as a powerful technology of international governance see Judith Kelley and Beth Simmons, *Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in International Relations*, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 59 (2014), No. 1, pp. 55-70.

operations. Conversely, a political decision to reverse the current course would likely reinforce systemic reliance of NATO, ending the aberration of experimenting with alternatives.

Under favourable circumstances, when vision would meet political capital, a more ambitious change could take place. Not only would the currently deferred investments be realised. (In 2016, only 10.52% of the defence expenditures was allocated for investments; even less was actually invested. The amount is now foreseen to increase to 20% in 2018 and longterm investment programmes have been drafted over the last several months at the Ministry of Defence. Their implementation, needless to say, will be the responsibility of the government formed after the upcoming general election.) The reform of the acquisition process could mitigate structural constraints on capacity described above which in turn could lead to a change in interests and ultimately behaviour. Such structural change, however, would come with political cost. It would require a clear definition and communication of demand with a focus on *niche* capabilities that could be real assets in EU military operations such as helicopters, effective advisory and training of local forces,¹¹ special forces or *gendarme*-type units evolving from the military police and trained for policing tasks in challenging environments; and turning the armed forces into a smart customer effectively cooperating with both domestic and international partners (through pooling and sharing), including in research and development.¹² The latter would require advanced action by the government in the negotiations concerning the upcoming Framework Programme 9, and would benefit from an overhaul of national defence research and education institutions leading to development here of

centres of excellence akin to the civil ones as hubs for public/private defence research enterprises.

External environment. Future participation in EU military operations is to be determined by both internal and external variables. The latter include the shaping of EU's own identity and ability as a security provider in the broader neighbourhood; and the trends in political instability there. The identity has been bolstered by the EUGS and further political declarations and implementation steps directed toward meeting the new level ambition broken down to three strategic priorities: responding to external conflicts and crises, building capacities of partner countries, and protecting the EU and its citizens.¹³ In the first area, the EU should be able to respond to crises, *inter alia*, to support conditions for achieving and implementing peace agreements and ceasefire arrangements and carrying out bridging operations, including in non-permissive environments, for the deployment of wider peacekeeping missions (UN); but also to protect civilians, deny hostile terrorist or armed groups a foothold in fragile countries, substituting or reinforcing domestic security, reinforcement or rule of law; or to provide rapid support to other actors.¹⁴ This means, in other words, performing a broad spectrum of tasks from peace enforcement involving assault forces to stabilisation and peacekeeping, policing and monitoring to training and assistance missions. Now more than a year after EUGS was embraced, implementation steps have been taken that are focused above all on increasing EU's capacity in the CSDP domain: an agreement on initiating PESCO in the area of security and defence to meet the level of ambition (but also on the principle on a single set of forces seeking to erase a line between EU- and NATO-related commitments);¹⁵ CARD; or introducing the Commission's

¹¹ At present, Czech contingent in EUTM Mali is tasked primarily with maintaining the security of HQ in Bamako. There are only two instructors engaged in actual training at the Koulikoro base. Similarly, while there is an ATT unit included in the Resolute Support operation in Kabul, the bulk of the Czech contingent (169 troops) is formed by members of the guard company at Bagram Air Field.

¹² For a more detailed recent argument concerning the smart customer approach, see Vilém Kolín, Česká republika a nová Společná bezpečnostní a obranná politika EU: Čas zásadních rozhodnutí, *Vojenské rozhledy* No. 3 (2017), retrieved from: <http://www.vojenskerozhledy.cz/kategorie/cr-a-nova-sbop-eu>.

¹³ Council of the European Union, *Council Conclusions on Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the Area of Security and Defence*, 14149/16 (14 Nov. 2016), retrieved from: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/11/14-conclusions-eu-global-strategy-security-defence/>.

¹⁴ Council of Europe, *Implementation Plan on Security and Defence*, 14392/16 (14 Nov. 2016), retrieved from: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_implementation_plan_st14392_en16_0.pdf.

¹⁵ Council of Europe, *Council Conclusions on Security and Defence in the Context of the EU Global Strategy*, 9178/17 (18 May

European Defence Action Plan (EDAP).¹⁶ Readiness has been another focus area. A new Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) was established in the EUMC, and while it is far from a full EU HQ for military operations previewed in plans to move toward European army following the Brexit vote, it is to serve as a command and control capacity for non-executive, EUTMs missions (including Somalia, RCA and Mali).¹⁷ Moreover, a new common financing arrangement is now being enacted for EUBGs to facilitate their actual deployment in the future in addition to measures to reinforce their preparation; achievement of advanced modularity so that the core can be supplied with special capabilities to make the deployment in particular circumstances as effective as possible; and early identification of follow-on forces.

There is now a clear momentum for further integration in the area of CSDP after years of stagnation, driven by changes in the external security environment and the search for legitimacy of the European project, and facilitated by the foreseen Brexit. Following a major internal crisis, the momentum could be reversed, however, with the likely eroding effect of the diminished future expectations of cooperation on the European security community. While this is unlikely at present, it is less clear how the existing momentum will be translated into EU military engagement abroad. Assuming the external security environment in what the *Strategic Review* (2015) terms the 'arc of instability' surrounding the EU¹⁸ is not to witness a major improvement in terms of stability in the near future, in the scenarios that foresee a baseline trend or minor deterioration, current deployments are likely to be maintained and the possibility of others may be expected as the same process described above at the national level may envelop at the European too: growing capabilities generate interest in their use, which in turn produces change in EU's strategic culture, with

a reinforcing effect on further development of capacities etc. The interest to engage in the wider neighbourhood is most likely to be directed to the Southern dimension where, according to the *Strategic Review*, 'ungoverned spaces' that allow criminals and terrorists to thrive abound together with the conflict generated by identity politics and resource scarcity. (In contrast, the Eastern dimension is characterised more by state fragility rather than failure, and the concomitant task is therefore rather to 'strengthen statehood' rather than to respond to immediate challenges.) Eastern deployments that can be contemplated at the moment are Nagorno Karabakh, but the conditions for deployment as a part of a roadmap to the conflict resolutions are not yet ripe; or major boost to ALTHEA in case of a sudden increase of instability in Bosnia. (The current trend here is the opposite, however: to reduce the mission essentially to training and advisory.) In the Southern dimension, the *menu* is more rich. EUFOR Libya has been contemplated but so far the operation has not generated sufficient interest among the Member States due to precarious ground conditions. It is more likely, therefore, that once a road is cleared for their deployment, opportunities will present themselves for EUBGs' use in future theatres: to complement the Berkane operation under French leadership in Niger, Senegal or Chad, or in other places of instability where eruption of conflict could generate major populations movements, such as in the African Horn, particularly should the African Union, to which the EU would be expected under normal conditions to provide assistance here as elsewhere – violent coups have become scarce in Africa over the last decade, but the possibility of instability generated by popular movements propelled e.g. by economic contractions due to low commodity prices remains – become incapacitated. A case example here would be internal destabilisation in Ethiopia

2017), retrieved from: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/05/18-conclusions-security-defence/>.

¹⁶ European Commission, *European Defence Action Plan*, COM(2016) 950 FINAL (30 Nov. 2016), retrieved from: <http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/20372>.

¹⁷ The MPCC is established as an analogue to the extant Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) and a new Joint Support Coordination Cell is to ensure their effective cooperation.

General Secretariat of the Council, *Concept Note: Operational Planning and Conduct Capabilities for CSDP Missions and Operations*, 6881/17 (6 Mar. 2017), retrieved from: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/.../st06881_en17.pdf.

¹⁸ *The European Union in a Changing Global Environment: A More Connected, Contested and Complex World*, retrieved from: <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/strategic-review-european-union-changing-global-environment>.

that could result in another round of war with Eritrea and/or effective withdrawal from Somalia, creating a power vacuum here. (A similar effect in the south of the country could ensue should Kenya withdraw from AMISOM as a result of prolonged internal unrest.)

Conclusion and Recommendations

In the baseline projection, the deepening of security and defence integration continues, resulting in more deployment (a function of *ambition x ability*) with the potential to create a positive feedback through the relationship between capacities, interests and strategic culture. In the foreseeable future, once hurdles to their use of EUBGs are effectively removed, EUBGs are likely to become an instrument of choice for EU's 'executive' crisis management.

The Czech Republic is likely to maintain the support to the process. However, without a major act of political will, the structural constraints to building efficient capacity needed to become a valued partner in the CSDP will not be removed. That said, path dependencies of decisions taken now are likely to produce minor positive effects. Adjustment conditioned on the sufficient political will, however, would produce positive feedback effects, also through outside incentives for effective collaboration such as those included in EDAP's capability and research window.

For a small state in CEE like the Czech Republic, there is a solid rationale to be serious about CSDP. To maintain a cohesive security community and thus a stable regional order in Europe and peace in its neighbourhood is a clear interest. Taking up more responsibility for common security and defence including more participation in the present and future EU military operations would make the Czech Republic a more trustworthy partner in the EU – and it could use that boost in reputation now. It would also make it a

more valuable partner in NATO. For 'a single set of forces' is not an abstract slogan; it is a reality.

Taking up the responsibility means that lofty declarations need to be met by deeds. Some recommendations for steps to be taken that follow from the previous analysis are:

- *Development of Scenarios.* Engagement starts with planning. To make the planning *and* acquisition process more effective, the government needs to have a sense of future contingencies and models of participation matching the level of ambition for the crisis situations that are deemed sufficiently probable. The EU may seek to conduct military crisis management operations in the entire spectrum of intensity in the foreseeable future, from training to peacekeeping to peace enforcement. For the executive operations, the more likely instrument is to be EUBGs, with the stand-by battle groups likely to be complemented with modules provided by any Member State based on the actual mission requirements and the principle of modularity. For the non-executive operations, the emphasis is likely to be placed on training missions that build partner resilience as a capacity of reform to changing circumstances.
- *Transformation of the Acquisition and Recruitment Process.* Based on the modelled situations for engagement in military crisis management, capacities to be acquired should be identified as part of the armed forces' 'shopping list'. These should be real new *niche* capacities¹⁹ for both executive and non-executive mandate operations ensuring best output for the costs: helicopters, effective advisory and training capacities²⁰ special forces and intelligence capabilities, or *gendarme*-type force suited for peacekeeping tasks (as for deployment at home in case of internal security emergencies). The Ministry of Defence should turn into

¹⁹ The signature capacities such as counter-WMDs or field hospital provided by the Czech armed forces are likely to be of less use in military crisis management in the likely operational theatres in near future .

²⁰ These capacities would be in much demand both for missions to build partners' resilience in the wider neighbourhood

and NATO missions such as the Resolute Support. The U.S. army now responds to the need for effective training and advisory, the lack of which has been cited as a cause e.g. for the rapid dissolution and defeat of Iraqi forces by ISIS in and around Mosul (2014), by forming new Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFAB).

a 'smart customer' capable of sensible identification of needs, their clear communication to suppliers, and partnership in research and development. Competitive defence industry able to produce prime technologies rather than supplying secondary weapons markets where demand is likely to be depressed in the future due to development of local manufacturing and humanitarian issues concerning their use are more likely (to wit, Saudi Arabia) – needs to be a part and parcel of the transformed defence system. The capability is a function of equipment and human capital. The Czech armed forces suffer from a longterm shortages and despite recent increase in the recruitment rate, many units remain undermanned. The recruitment process too, therefore, needs to be reformed to provide sufficient incentives attracting enough capable women and men to service in order to meet the current ambition of 32,000 professional troops and, among other, *defragment* contributions to either NATO and EU operations through the development of a full light brigade designated and trained for military crisis management tasks. Both the acquisition and recruitment systems betray a considerable inertia that needs to be overcome. Now is

the unique moment of opportunity to invest political vision and resolve to that end.

- *Genuine Cooperation.* An effective defence system can be developed by benefiting from cooperation not just with the domestic research and industrial entities, but also from international partnerships: bilateral (including further development of cooperation in Germany in terms of pooling also of crisis management capacities), regional or even broader, such as the PESCO of which the Czech Republic should become an active member whichever concept – of German's more inclusive and clustered one, or the French core-based and focused on utmost effectiveness – prevails. In the world where the costs of technologies rise faster²¹ than defence budgets of even those countries that take the 2% defence pledge seriously, there is no EU Member State that would not benefit from more cooperation now also to be incentivised through the EDF. Such open approach to cooperation is however premised on overcoming the residual but deeply coded nationalist mindset in defence planning and, on a more general level, assuming a less ambivalent position toward the EU as a whole.

Ondřej Ditrych

Ondřej Ditrych, MPhil. Ph.D. is Director of the Institute of International Relations Prague and Academic Fellow at Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences. His research interests include terrorism, Transatlantic security and defence policy, and the global normative order and its discontents.



Co-funded by the
Europe for Citizens Programme
of the European Union

²¹ The defence inflation rate is usually estimated at 10%. See Christian Mölling et al., *European Defence Monitoring (EDM)*,

Working Paper FG3 No. 1 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2014).